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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
The U.S. agricultural sector has been making an important contribution 
to this country and the world in satisfying the increasing demand for 
food, but it is confronted with several important problems. There are 
critical issues relating to farm size and structure, supply control, 
energy costs, water management and supply, soil loss, environmental 
protection, and so on. 
Water is an old yet a new problem in the United States. The 
17 Western states depend upon irrigation, and groundwater is an 
important water source in many states including Kansas, Oklahoma, 
Texas, New Mexico, Nebraska, Colorado, Wyoming, Florida, California, 
Idaho, and Oregon. Groundwater is pumped from underground aquifers. 
With the recent intensive development of irrigation, falling water stocks 
and rising energy prices are threatening the agricultural economies in many 
regions where the amount of water that recharges the aquifer is small, 
relative to the withdrawals. The control and allocation of the limited 
groundwater stock is crucial in regions which face a declining water 
table. 
The Ogallala is a groundwater aquifer extending from north of the 
Nebraska-South Dakota border to the southern edge of the Texas Panhandle. 
The area irrigated in the Ogallala Aquifer expanded from six million acres 
in 1959 to more than nine million acres in 1974. It represents nearly 
55 percent of the increase in area irrigated between 1959 and 1974 and 
2 
currently accounts for nearly a fourth of the total area irrigated in 
the United States. In the Texas Panhandle, where an expansion in 
irrigation began in the 1940,s, the irrigation boom is coming to an 
end and some farmers have recently been forced to return to dryland 
farming because the water table has dropped too low for irrigation to 
be economically viable. Even where water is sufficient, many farmers 
are shutting off wells and putting fields back into dryland cultivation 
because fuel costs for pumping water are soaring (Wall Street Journal 
(80)). Thus, this region, which has had a comparative advantage in feed 
grain production and cattle feeding due to the development of irrigation 
projects, is now losing its advantage. 
Natural resources can be divided into two categories; (1) renewable 
resources, such as fish and timber, and (2) nonrenewable resources, such 
as petroleum, natural gas, and minerals. Groundwater resources in the 
long run belong to the first category since they are renewable through 
recharge. However, in some instances the rate of recharge may be so 
small relative to the stock that they may be considered nonrenewable 
(at least the supply above the recharge rate). This is the case for 
petroleum resources for example. The analysis of groundwater is rela­
tively simple compared to other renewable resources since the quantity of 
resources added to stock per period (i.e., natural recharge) may in many 
instances be treated as independent of the quantity of resource in the 
stock or reserve in the same period. 
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Purpose of the Study 
Several authors have investigated groundwater mining using a 
variety of methods. Hughes and Harman (31) used a recursive linear pro­
gramming model to predict the economic life of water resources over the 
period 1966-2015 inclusive for a portion of the Texas Panhandle area. 
Mapp and Dobbins (40) estimated the effects of increased energy costs 
on the use of water and fossil fuel energy in the Oklahoman Panhandle 
using a static and recursive linear programming model. Also, Young 
and Coomer (81) projected the potential effect of varied natural gas 
prices and alternative commodity prices on return to groundwater re­
sources in the Texas High Plains using a recursive linear programming model. 
Burt (7, 8, 10) developed a dynamic programming model to estimate the 
final equilibrium model and analyzed an "approximately optimal decision 
rule". Recently, Short (50) used a regional, recursive, linear pro­
gramming model and analyzed the future competitive variability of irri­
gation from the Ogallala Aquifer. However, all authors ignored the 
commonality problem governing allocations of groundwater. 
Groundwater is one of the common property resources as pointed 
out by Milliman (42, p. 426) more than two decades ago; 
. . . water resources are often exploited or utilized in common 
so that important "spill-over" costs exists. The commonality of 
use prevents the onus of costs from falling upon the particular 
pumper and causes a divergence between private and social costs. 
As a result the optimum allocation of water resources is hampered. 
Because of the "spill-over" costs, each user of water pumps more than 
the optimum level and this over-utilization of water leads to welfare loss 
4 
for the group of users as a whole. 
The overall objectives of this study are to measure economic losses 
and excessive depletion due to a commonality and to evaluate available 
policies for internalizing a commonality. As a preliminary work, a' 
general model of production using common property resources is built and 
the extraction patterns for common property resources are examined. Based 
on this preliminary work, the above objectives are accomplished by 
(1) formulating a dynamic groundwater mining model, (2) deriving the 
socially optimal path for groundwater use, (3) measuring the gains realized 
by the optimal policy versus a no-policy alternative, (4) examining 
several possible water policies including taxation and quota policies, 
and (5) evaluating the sensitivity of results to the impacts of changes 
in crop and energy prices. 
Methodology of the Study 
Based upon the characteristics of the groundwater resource described 
above, a control model is developed to determine the optimal exploitation 
path of groundwater. The control model which includes the amounts of 
water exploited as control (or policy) variables and the depths to water 
as state variables, is solved by "optimal control theory"^. 
A traditional instrument for intertemporal analysis is the calculus 
of variations. This is one approach to the control problem. However, more 
^Concepts of control theory are discussed in Appendix A. 
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powerful approaches were developed based on it; promoted mainly by the 
requirements of space technology. They are dynamic programming based on 
"Bellman's equation" and the maximum principle developed by L.S. 
Pontryagin. These are modern approaches to the control problem. In 
this study, the maximum principle is employed since it suggests the nature 
of the solution which is important for economic analysis. 
Outline of the Study 
The following outline is used in the study. Items are listed in 
the sequence in which they are covered in the subsequent text. 
1. A discussion of theoretical aspects of common property resources 
is given. It focuses on factors determining intertemporal 
exploitation patterns of common property resources and on a 
comparison of a social optimal model eind a free market model. 
2. The empirical model to be applied in the Southern Ogallala 
Aquifer is reviewed. 
3. Empirical solutions are then presented and analyzed with 
specific emphasis on the comparison of the social optimal 
solution and the free market solution. 
4. After discussion on policies for achieving the social optimal 
allocation of resources, empirical solutions for policy 
alternatives are presented and analyzed. Conclusions on the 
manner in which a flexible taxation might be the best policy 
are then given. 
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CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF EXPLOITATION 
OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES 
The main aim of this chapter is to examine the extraction patterns 
for common property resources. Common property resources such as 
fisheries, groundwater, and petroleum can be exploited or utilized by 
more than one individual so that its social exploitation cost is not 
covered by its private cost. Without an appropriate agreement by all 
users of the resources, over-exploitation arises and this leads to 
welfare loss.^ 
The common property problem has been discussed thoroughly by 
H. Gordon (23) for the fishery and Milliman (42) for groundwater. A 
dynamic model with common property problems has been developed by 
R. Gordon (24), Burt (7), Smith (54), and Cummings (15). However, these 
papers have given little attention to factors determining intertemporal 
exploitation patterns of the common property resources and hereafter called 
2 determination factors. 
This chapter focuses on the determination factors, of intertemporal 
exploitation patterns of common property resources. In the next section, 
a general model of production using common property resources is pre­
sented and the determination factors of intertemporal exploitation patterns 
^In the sense that the exploitation path would decrease the present 
value from production using the common property resources. 
2 
The rate of extraction of exhaustible resources is examined by 
Stiglitz and Sweeney with an emphasis on market forces. 
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are examined. The third section presents the groundwater utilization 
model with deposits of different grades and examines the intertemporal 
exploitation patterns. Finally, the fourth section presents a summary 
and conclusions. 
Exploitation of Common 
Property Resources 
Although there are several common property resources, three typical 
resources: fisheries, groundwater, and petroleum are specifically con­
sidered in this chapter. It is assumed that there are n homogeneous 
firms and each firm maximizes the present value of the future stream of 
net profits from production using the common property resources. We 
assume that the market is atomistic or competitive so that each firm is a 
price-taker. We also assume that the number of firms, n, which extract 
the common property resources and produce the final product using the 
resources, is constant since once invested it is difficult to exit from the 
industry. Examples of these types of firms are irrigation farmers 
and petroleum firms. 
Let u(t) represent the quantity of the resource to be extracted 
and used for production of the final product at time t. Let x(t) 
represent the amount of the resource in stock at time t. Let p(t) 
describe the price of final product at time t. The production function, 
f(u,t), is assumed to be characterized by diminishing returns, i.e., 
'v, ^  'uu < 0^ - (2-11 
^As usual notation, partial derivatives of functions of several vari­
ables are expressed by the function with a subscript, e.g., f = 9f/3u and 
fuu = 32f/3u2. 
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The cost of extraction and production per time period, C(u,x,t), 
depends upon the amount of the resource extracted and used, the re­
source stock, and possibly upon time. It is assumed to be of the form, 
CX < 0' CXX > 0' CU > 0' CUU > 0' CUX < 0' (=':) 
Each firm has no control over stock size, however, it reflects upon his 
cost function. Thus C <0 indicates stock externalities. C >0 and 
X u 
> 0 exhibits an increasing marginal cost with respect to resources. 
Let X = g(x)^ represent the biological growth function or the yield 
function. It implies natural reproduction of the resources. The shape 
of g(x) depends upon the type of the resource. A renewable resource is 
assumed to generally have the inverted U shape g(x) like a fishery 
(Figure 2.1). However, for groundwater, its natural recharge is inde­
pendent of the stock level and it is assumed to have a fixed recharge 
2 level (Figure 2.2). Nonrenewable resources like petroleum have no 
natural reproduction, and therefore, it is assumed that g(x) equals 
zero (Figure 2.3). Thus, g(x) is assumed to be of the form. 
g > 0 if X < X 
X m 
g < 0 if X > X 
X m 
and 
g^^< 0 for fisheries, (2.3) 
dot above the variable indicates the time rate of change of that 
variable, e.g., x = dx/dt. 
2 
Natural recharge is larger for smaller stock levels and smaller for 
larger stock levels than those presented in Figure 2.2. However, these 
extreme cases can be ignored. 
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X 
g(x) 
X *m 
Figure 2.1. The yield function for fisheries 
10 
g(x) 
—*• 
X 
Figure 2.2. The yield function for groundwater 
11 
. i I 
X 
g(x) 
Figure 2.3. The yield function for nonrenewable resources 
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where the resource is reproduced at its maximum rate at x = x . 
m 
g(x) = constant and = 0 for groundwater (2.4) 
g(x) =0 and g^ = 0 for nonrenewable resources. (2.5) 
Each n homogeneous firm extracts the resources per time period by 
u(t); therefore, total extraction per time period is n.u. Hence, the 
system equation can be written as follows: 
X = g(x) - n.u. (2.6) 
If the central authority determines the extraction and production 
rates for each firm so as to maximize the joint profit of all firms, 
or if there is a sole ownership, then the following constrained maximiza­
tion problem is solved; 
Max 
u 
CO 
n[p(t)-f(u,t) - C(u,x,t)]e ^^dt 
(S)/ 
0 
subject to 
X = g(x) - n.u. 
where r is the discount ràte.^ 
The problem (S) can be solved using optimal control theory. Let 
A be a present time co-state variable or a shadow price associated with 
the constraint (2.6). The Hamiltonian function can be written as follows: 
For formal formulation, the nonnegativity constraints (u(t) ^  0 
and x(t)i ^ 0)are usually included. However, they are ignored for 
simplicity assuming interior solutions. 
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H(u,x,X,t) = n(p(t)-f(u,t) - C(u,x,t)]e 
+ X[g(x) - n.u.] (2.7) 
The Hamiltonian is a concave function of the state variable, x; hence, 
the sufficient condition for optimality is satisfied. The necessary 
conditions for maximization are as follows ;^ 
(a) ^ = n[p"f^ - Cy]e - X*n = 0 
so that: p-f^ = + X (2.8) 
where X = X*e^^. 
... < 3 H _ -rt , (b) X = - 5— = n.C -e - X «g , 
dx X ^x 
A A 
so that: X = nC^ - [g^ - r]X, (2.9) 
(c) X = = g(x) - n-u. (2.10) 
The left-hand side of the Equation (2.8) is the marginal value 
product of the resources (flow). The right-hand side of (2.8) is divided 
into two terms: is the marginal cost of the resources, and X is the 
current value co-state variable or the user cost which implies the present 
value of profits foregone in future periods due to an increase in resource 
use at time t. Thus, the optimal rate of extraction and use of the 
resources for final-product production is that rate at which the marginal 
value product equals the sum of the marginal cost and the user cost 
1 
In addition, the transversality condition lim X(t) = 0 should be 
t-+oo 
satisfied for optimality (32, 38). 
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(Figure 2.4). The result is identical with that in the literature.^ 
Equation (2.9) represents the time rate of change of the co-state 
variable over time along the optimal path. Equation (2.10) is the same 
as Equation (2.6) and implies the constraint on extraction. 
How are the intertemporal exploitation patterns of the common 
property resources determined? The system of Equations (2.8), (2.9), 
and (2.10) gives us the optimum exploitation path u*(t) given the 
initial stock of the resources x^ = x(t=0). Therefore, the question will 
be answered by the nature of the system of the equations. Let us assume 
that p, f, and C are all independent of t for simplicity. 
Solving for û yields 
• ^-^x - [9x-r](P'fu-Cu) + Cux % 
p.f - C (2.11) 
uu uu 
or 
n-C - [g -r](p.f -C ) +C [g(x)-n-u] 
Ù = p.f \ g • (2.12) 
^ uu uu 
If u>0, then it implies that the resource will be extracted less in 
the beginning periods and more in the later periods. If û = 0, then the 
rate of extraction will be the same for all periods. If u <0, then the 
resource will be extracted more in the beginning periods and the rate of 
extraction will be decreasing as time passes. 
Since the sign of the denominator is always negative, the sign of 
û is determined by the numerator. Hence, 
See Milliman (42) and Cummings (15). Milliman called the marginal 
social cost the sum of the marginal cost and the user cost. Cummings 
derived the result including the boundary terms. 
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$ 
MC + X 
MVP 
u 
Figure 2.4. The optimal equilibrium 
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• > 
u — 0 as n*C 
or 
• > 
u — 0 as n-C (2.13) 
Here < 0, and < 0 by the assumptions, however, we do not know 
the sign of [g^-r] and x. 
Equation (2.11) tells us the determination factors of intertemporal 
exploitation patterns. From (11), 9u/9r = (pfy-Cy)/(pfyy-Cyy) < 0, 
X > 0. First, the lower the discount rate (r), the larger the change of 
the exploitation rate. In other words, if the discount rate goes up, then 
the exploitation path will become less steep (Figure 2.5). Second, 
the greater the total stock externality (n*C^), the greater the slope of 
the exploitation path. It means that if the total stock externality be­
comes larger, then the exploitation path will change more rapidly as 
illustrated in Figure 2.6 since < 0. Third, the larger the slope of 
the yield function i<3^) > the steeper the slope of the exploitation path. 
The relationship between the sign of u and the determination factors 
is expressed by (2.13), in general. However, each common property resource 
has a different relationship because of its original nature. They are 
1 
listed in Table 2.1. For petroleum g(x) =0 (hence g^ = 0) and x ^  0 
^For petroleum, the extraction cost is independent of output (Smith 
(54, p. 415)). Therefore, if only extraction cost is considered then Cy 
is equal to zero. However, cost of both extraction of the resources and 
production of the final product are included here. Accordingly, is 
3u/3(n-C^) = l/(pf^^-C^^) < 0 and aû/Sg^ = -(pfy-C^^/Xpf^^-C^^) > 0 if 
positive 
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U(t )  
With lower 
discount rate 
With higher 
discount rate 
t 
Figure 2.5. Exploitation paths and the discount rate 
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U(t )  
With greater 
stock externality 
^ With smaller 
stock externality 
t 
Figure 2.6. Exploitation paths and the total stock 
externality 
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u(t) 
With larger |g^| 
^With smaller |g^| 
t 
Figure 2.7. Exploitation paths and the slope of the yield 
function 
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Table 2.1. The relationships between u and the determination factors 
Resources Relationship 
Nonrenewable Û ^  0 as n*C + r(p-f -C ) + 
x u u ^ux 
.  x  
< 
0 
(1) Petroleum 
where C^<0, <p.f^-c^)>0, <0, and X 
_5 
Renewable 
(1) Groundwater 
u ^  0 as n•C + r(p•f -C ) + 
x u u ^ux 
•  x  
v
l 
a
 
0 
where C < 0, (p.f -C ) >0, and 
x u u ^ux 
< 0. 
(2) Fisheries Û ^  0 as n-C^ + [g^^-r] (p-f^-C^) + C 
ux 
• 
x  ^  0 
where C < 0, (p•f -C ) > 0, and 
x u u 
C 
ux 
< 0. 
since it is a nonrenewable resource. For groundwater, the g^ term drops 
out since g(x) is constant (hence g^ = 0). But we do not know the sign 
of X because groundwater is a renewable resource and it depends on the 
amount of net recharge and the amount of groundwater pumped in specific 
time periods. 
The system of three equations also shows the optimal trajectory of 
the stock (state variable, x) together with the optimal path of the 
exploitation rate of the resources (control variable, u). The functional 
relationship between u and x can be presented by drawing the phase 
diagram which has a phase space (u,x). 
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Prom (2.10) and x = 0, 
- r -  » • » '  
'x=0 
The singular curve x = 0 divides the phase space (u,x) into two parts 
and the sign of (2.14) indicates the slope of the singular curve x = 0. 
From (2.8), (2.9), (2.10), and ù = 0, 
du 
dx 
- «Kx'P-V=u' * ':9*-r'Cux 
û-o" • 
Similarly, the singular curve û = 0 divides the phase space (u,x) into 
two parts and the sign of (2.15) shows the slope of the singular curve 
Û = 0.^ 
(ii) § < 9% < r: 
(ii-a) n'C^-g^(pf^-C^) + (2g^-r)C^> 0: >0. 
' u f O  
(ll-b) 
(iii) r<g^: 
(iii-a) n'C^-9^(pf^-C^) + (2g^-^)C^x > ° = Ê|. _ 
I u = 0  
(iii-b) + <2g^-^)C^>0: > 0. 
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From (2.10), for fisheries 
•5^ = g >0 for x  <  x  ^  
ox X m 
< 0 for x  >  x  . (2.16) 
m 
Equation (2.16) implies that at points to the left of the x = 0 curve, 
X is negative (positive), while for points to the left of the x = 0 
curve, X is positive (negative) for x < x^ (x>x^). Further, from (2.12), 
for fisheries 
- r - . (2.17) 
From (2.17), it follows that at points above the curve ù = 0, ù is 
positive (negative), while for points below the curve ù = 0, û is 
negative (positive) for g^ < r (g^ > r). 
The phase diagrams for fisheries can be drawn as in Figure 2.8 
2 
using (2.14-2.17). The optimal path depends upon the initial condition 
for x, and the initual u will be chosen so that it can move along 
the unique path approaching the saddle point (x*, u*) as drawn in Figure 
2.8 by the cut line with the arrows. 
For groundwater and petroleum, 
g 
^^1 = —^ = 0 since g =0. (2.18) 
'^x = X where g =0. 
m X 
2 Note that g^ < r at û = 0 and x = 0. 
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g^=r/2 
2.8. Phase diagrams for fisheries 
Case 1: 
^xx 
+ (2gx-r)Cux>0 
Case 2: 
^^xx 9xx^P^u~^u^ 
* "V'<=ux<° 
Case 3: 
+ <29x-r)C„x<0 
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du 
dx (2.19) 
(2 .20)  
(2.21) 
Similarly, the phase diagram for groundwater is constructed in Figure 
2-9. It is clear that the unique path to (x*, u*) is the optimal path 
because all other paths.approach to infinitely large u and zero x 
or infinitely large x and zero u. As can be seen from the phase diagram, 
the optimal policy for x^ < x* is to increase continually the rate of 
extraction and the optimal policy for x^ > x* is to decrease continually 
the rate of extraction before x reaches x*. 
The phase diagram for petroleum is drawn in Figure 2.10. It shows 
that the optimal policy for x^ > x* is to exploit continually before x 
declines to the x* level, and after that point the exploitation of 
petroleum is ceased and the well will be abandoned. 
In the previous section, we analyzed the'determination factors on 
intertemporal exploitation patterns of common property resources and its 
optimal exploitation path. In this section, the model is extended in two 
aspects and it is applied to groundwater for agricultural production. 
Exploitation of Common Property Resources with Deposits 
of Different Grades.; Groundwater 
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ù=0 
u 
x=0 
X* X 
ù=0 
x=0 u 
X 
Figure 2.9. Phase diagrams for groundwater 
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Case 1 
Case 2 
x=0 
Figure 2.10. Phase diagrams for petroleum 
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First, the exploitation model with deposits of different grades 
of common property resources is considered. As in the real world, some 
natural resources have different grades of resource deposits. Petroleum 
is pooled with different qualities and with different locations in the 
ground or in the ocean. Groundwater is pumped from wells with different 
depth to water and used for irrigation over different grades of land. 
Using the same amount of water, some lands produce more crops and other 
lands less. 
Second, the centralized, controlled, or social optimal model is 
• 1 
compared with the decentralized, uncontrolled, or free market model. 
The former model is described in the previous section and assumes that 
the central authority determines or regulates the exploitation rate of 
the common property resources so as to maximize joint profit of all 
firms who share the common property resources. It permits the social 
cost of exploitation to be covered and borne by its private cost. The 
latter model assumes that each firm sharing the common property resources 
exploits it so as to maximize his own profit. In this case, each firm 
exploits the resource until the point where the marginal value product 
equals the marginal exploitation cost, and in addition if the entry to 
industry is free like a fishery then each firm exploits more resources 
until the point is reached where the marginal value product equals the 
^In the literature of economics of exhaustible resources, this 
comparison was done by H. Gordon (23), Christy and A. Scott (12), 
Smith (54), Cummings (15), and Peterson and Fisher (45). 
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average exploitation cost. 
For both the social optimal and free market model, it is assumed 
that there are N deposits of different grades and that n^^ homogenous 
firms share resource deposits of the same grade. Therefore, there are 
N 
E n. homogeneous firms. 
i=l ^ 
Social optimal model 
The problem is formulated as follows: 
foo N 
f -rt 
lax Z {n. [p(t)'f. (u. ,t) - C. (u. ,x,t) ] }e dt (2.22) 
u J 0 i=l ^ ^ ^ ^ 
I 
/"Ma
(A) 
subject to x = g(x) - E n..u. (2.23) 
i=l ^ 1 
where 
A , , T 
u = tu^,...,u^,...,u^ . 
The production functions and the cost functions are assumed to be of 
the form, 
f > 0, f < 0, (2.24) 
u uu 
C < 0, C > 0, C  > 0, C > 0, C  <0. (2.25) 
x  x x  u uu ux 
The yield function g(x) is assumed to be constant since natural recharge 
is constant in the long run although it changes randomly. It should be 
noted that there is one more important assumption which is not included 
in the problem (S) in the previous section. Here, the deposit of better 
grade has two meanings; one is more productive land with respect to a 
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given input of water and the other is a lower cost of extracing water in 
the sense that a well has shallower depth to water. Hence, it follows 
that 
larger f^ (marginal productivity) and smaller (marginal cost) 
result for deposits of better grade. (2.26) 
This assumption (2.26) plays a critical role in determining the 
optimal exploitation rate. 
The Hamiltonian function for the problem (A) can be expressed as 
follows : 
N 
H(u,x,A,t) = Z {n.[p(t)•f.(u.,t) - C.(u.,x,t)}e ^ 
i=l ^ ^ 
N 
+ X[g(x) - 2 n. ' u . ]  (2.27) 
i=l 
where X is a co-state variable or a shadow price associated with the 
N 
constraint x = g(x) - Z n^-u^. The sufficient condition is satisfied 
i=l 
since the Hamiltonian is a concave function of the state variable, x. 
The necessary conditions for optimization are: 
(a) = n. [P-f. -C. ]e - A-n. = 0 for all i, 
du. 1 lU. lU. 1 1 11
so that: P.f. = C. + X for all i, (2.28) 
lu. lu. 
1 1 
where X = A'e^^. 
^ - If = "i-C-x-e-rt _ X-g^ 
1=1 
/S N A 
s o  that: X = Z n.'C. + r-X (2.29) 
i=l ^ 
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since g =0. 
x  
8H N 
(c) x  = %T- = g(x) - Z ni'U.. (2.30) 
9A 1 
Equation (2.28) implies that the marginal value product is equal to 
the sum of the marginal cost and the user cost at the optimal rate of 
exploitation for all deposits of different grades i = 1,...,N. 
The system of (2.28), (2.29), and (2.30) with N+2 equations 
describes the optimal path of the exploitation rate and the path of 
stock level associated with it. 
Totally differentiating (2.28) and arranging it with (2.29) yields^ 
E "i'Cix + r'P-'iu.-Ciu.l + Ciux'* 
i = l  1 1 1  
"i = - =iu. '2-31' 
This means that 
> N < 
ùi - as n..C.^ + r(P-fiu.-Ciu.) + C. .x - 0 
or 
i=l * """i ^"i ^"i* ^ 
Û. —  as E n.'C. + r *X+C. -x—0 for all i  (2.32) 
1  <  .  ,  1  i x  l u . x  >  
1=1 1 
since 
p.f. - C. <0. 
l u  .  u  .  l u  .  u .  
11 11 
The determination factors of intertemporal exploitation patterns 
of groundwater can be determined by (2.32). First, the lower the dis­
count rate (r), the higher will be the change of the exploitation rate. 
Lets assume that p, f and C are all independent of t. 
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Second, the greater the total stock externality (nu.C^^), the larger 
will be the exploitation rate. The greater the initial stock, the larger 
will be the co-state variable [the greater initial stock iitçlies lower 
marginal cost, hence larger co-state variables from (2.28)]. There­
fore, third, the greater the initial stock via the larger co-state 
variable, the higher will be the exploitation rate. The results are 
the same as those of the previous section where deposits of the same 
grade were analyzed. 
However, there is one more important result which reflects the case 
of deposits of different grades. By assumption (2.26), for deposits 
of better grades i.e., for better water situation and better land, 
f^ is larger and is smaller, hence [p'f^-C^] is larger as shown in 
Table 2.2. As a result, the better the water situation and the better 
the land, the more groundwater will be pumped and utilized for irrigation. 
This pattern is illustrated in Figure 2.11. 
Table 2.2. Comparison: good water situation and good land vs. bad water 
situation and bad land 
f >0 C >0 p-f - C > 0  
u u u u 
Good water situation and good land larger smaller larger 
Bad water situation and bad land smaller larger smaller 
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With better 
water situation 
and land 
With worse 
water situation 
and land 
t 
Figure 2.11. Exploitation path, the water situation and land 
class 
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Free market model 
The same assumptions for the social optimal model: (2.24), (2.25), 
and (2.26) are used for free market model. 
However, the model formulation is distinguished from the social 
optimal model. Each firm chooses the optimal exploitation rate so as to 
maximize his own benefit; hence, the problem is formulated as follows; 
(B) Max L(u.) = p(t)'f.(u.,t) -C.(u.,x,t) for all t. 
U ^  1  1 1 1 1  
First order conditions for maximum net profits are: 
P'f^y = C. for all i and for all t. (2.33) 
i i 
Second order conditions are satisfied since f. - C. <0 for 
l u . u .  l u . u .  11 11 
all i. 
The left-hand side of the Equation (2.33) is the marginal value 
product, while the right-hand side of (2.33) is the marginal cost. 
Accordingly, it follows that the optimal path for u^ is determined at the 
points where the marginal value product is equal to the marginal cost. 
In Figure 2.12, the optimal level of u is u^ for problem B (free market 
model) and u^ for problem A (social optimal model). It indicates that 
over-utilization of the resource when each firm behaves so as to maximize 
only his profit without centralized management or agreement among all 
firms who share the resources. 
The Equation (2.33) given the initial stock of the resources, 
determines the optimal path for the problem (B). Solving for û from 
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$ 
MC + A 
MC 
MVP 
u u u 
Figure 2.12. The optimal equilibrium for the social optimal and 
free market model 
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(2.33) gives 
(2.34) 
will be negative (positive), since C. < 0, f. 
i i lU.U. X 1 
< 0, C. 
lU.U. 
1 1 
> 0 
if X is negative (positive). Since production in a better water and land 
situation has a smaller marginal cost and a larger marginal value of 
product, the marginal cost curve shifts down while the marginal value 
product curve shifts up. Hence, they intersect at a higher level of u 
resulting in more water utilization than a worse water and land situation 
as shown in Figure 2.13, where a subscript w indicates a worse water 
and land situation and a subscript b indicates a better water and land 
situation. 
In summary, different grades of groundwater are exploited and utilized 
simultaneously, but better grades of groundwater having a better water and 
land situation are exploited with more concentration. The decentralized, 
uncontrolled, or free market model exploits more water than the centralized, 
controlled, or social optimal model. This section concludes that without 
centralized management or agreement the situation leads to the over-
exploitation of common property resources, and it brings about social 
welfare loss to the group who shares the resources and also early 
depletion of the resources. 
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Figure 2.13. The optimal equilibrium with different grades of 
water and land situation 
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Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to find the determination factors of 
intertemporal exploitation patterns of the common property resources. 
It has been shown that, first, the lower the discount rate the higher 
the change of the exploitation rate; second, the greater the stock 
externality the greater the slope of the exploitation rate; and third, 
the steeper the slope of the yield function the larger the change of 
the exploitation rate. 
With reference to groundwater mining, it has been shown that the 
better the water and land situation the more groundwater will be pumped 
and used for irrigation for both the social optimal and free market model. 
This result gives us a good insight into the mechanism of groundwater 
mining and better advice for groundwater management. 
38 
CHAPTER III. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
This chapter describes an empirical model and the process of 
deriving technical coefficients for the model to transfer the theoretical 
model of the previous chapter into the empirical model from which experi­
mental results can be obtained. 
In the first section, the study area is introduced. The second 
section provides techniques of parameter estimations that are used for the 
empirical model. Finally, the empirical model which has a form of 
discrete-time and finite-horizon is presented. 
The Area of Study 
The Southern High Plains of Texas and New Mexico (Figure 3.1) 
was selected as the area of study for two reasons: (1) this area 
depends heavily on groundwater, (2) irrigation farming has been 
developed intensively, and (3) the problem water table decline is 
serious in this area. The counties included in the study area 
consist of Bailey, Castro, Crosby, Floyd, Hale, Hockley, Lamb, 
Lubbock, Lynn, and Parmer counties in Texas and Curry and Roosevelt 
Counties in New Mexico. This group of counties has been identified 
as a single watershed (subarea 1205) of the Braxos River basin by 
the U.S. Water Resource Council. 
The study area currently includes about eight million acres of 
total land and five million acres of cropland and is projected to 
have four million acres of cropland in 1990 (Short et al. (51)). The 
Figure 3.1. 
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major crops currently produced in the study area are grain sorghum, cotton, 
wheat, and corn, with more wheat production in the southern counties and 
more corn production in the northern counties (Table 3.1). The total 
irrigated acreage in this area has been at almost the same level since 
1964, while the irrigated area is increasing in the entire Texas High 
Plains region (Figure 3.2). The area depends heavily on groundwater 
and the share of surface water utilization is less than one percent of 
total water used for irrigation (Texas Water Development Board (61)). 
Also, the water table has been declining every year (Table 3.2). 
Parameter Estimation 
In order to apply the optimization model to intertemporal alloca­
tion of groundwater in the Southern Ogallala Aquifer, net return func­
tions for irrigation and dryland farming, water relations (equations of 
motion), and the distribution of land with different land classes and 
depth to water are estimated. Then, the optimization model in Chapter II 
is modified from continuous-time to discrete-time and solved for the 
years 1985-2005. 
The net return functions 
Net returns for irrigation and dryland farming unaer different crop 
price levels, energy price levels, water situations, and land classes are 
obtained by solving a linear programming model parametrically.^ They are 
used to estimate the net return functions for irrigation and dryland 
^It is more fully discussed in Appendix B. 
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Table 3.1. Major crop production in the study area in 1969 and 1974* 
County 
Sorghums 
for grain 
(bushels) 
Cotton 
(bales) 
Wheat 
(bushels) 
Com for 
grain 
or seed 
(bushels) 
Bailey [1969] 4,209,078 42,797 211,197 983,495 
[1974] 1,724,156 25,422 228,496 1 ,990,014 
Castro [1969] 10,519,231 26,193 2,100,512 2 ,307,732 
[1974] 6,668,409 25,715 1,808,721 8 ,433,782 
Crosby [1969] 3,437,639 79,117 667,652 16,942 
[1974] 2,606,212 80,599 287,550 92,416 
Floyd [1969] 7,604,408 66,398 1,896,587 130,356 
[1974] 8,297,268 84,198 1,539,180 261,808 
Hale [1969] 14,095,378 87,515 1,046,308 265,799 
[1974] 13,946,037 95,562 1,127,814 973,908 
Hockley [1969] 3,897,024 130,045 46,310 30,416 
[1974] 2,208,178 98,248 52,063 7,138 
Lamb [1969] 8,172,578 128,426 159,311 960,113 
[1974] 7,164,747 131,392 326,581 5 ,343,291 
Lubbock [1969] 6,438,826 178,732 111,422 40,713 
[1974] 3,335,871 168,177 148,165 15,249 
Lynn [1969] 3,022,442 136,600 28,983 5,306 
[1974] 419,070 61,563 22,827 480 
Parmer [1969] 15,533,-409 34,519 2,436,485 1 ,342,492 
[1974] 5,681,374 25,071 2,061,938 17 ,570,288 
Curry [1969] 5,619,214 920 2,140,734 42,258 
[1974] 3,459,214 626 2,012,327 1 ,589,662 
Roosevelt [1969] 2,114,900 6,701 301,488 42,898 
[1974] 2,192,396 5,784 435,064 130,736 
TOTAL [1969] 84,664,127 917,954 11,146,989 6 ,173,520 
[1974] 57,702,932 802,357 10,050,726 36 ,408,772 
^U.S. Department of Commerce (74). 
42 
CO 
<_) 
<c 
6 . 0  
5 . 0  
4 . 0  
3 . 0  
2 . 0  
1.0 
High Plains ^ 
The Study Area 
J I I I I I J I I I I I L 
1964 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 
Includes the study area (except Curry and Roosevelt in New Mexico) 
and the additional 30 counties in Texas 
Figure 3.2. Acres irrigated (58, 59) 
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Table 3.2. The change of water level^ 
The decline of the 
Year water table ^ 
(feet per year) 
1967 0.67 
1968 0.54 
1969 2.35 
1970 1.05 
1971 0.88 
1972 0.76 
1973 1.37 
1974 1.65 
^U.S. Department of the Interior (78). 
^Well number 341008N1022412 at Lamb County. 
farming. 
The general form of a net return function from irrigated farming 
using groundwater is: 
NRI = f (D, U, CP, EP, XI) (3.1) 
where NRI is the amount of net return per acre from irrigation for a 
given year; D is the depth to water; U is the amount of water applied 
per acre in a given year; CP is the crop price index; EP is the energy 
price index; and XI is a dummy variable for land class. 
44 
Since dryland farming does not use groundwater, the variables D and 
U will drop from the net return function for dryland farming. The general 
form of the net return function for dryland farming is as follows : 
NRD = g(CP, EP, XI) (3.2) 
where NRD is the amount of net return from dryland farming for a given 
year. In determining a specific functional form from the general 
specification of Equations (3.1) and (3.2), a quadratic is used since 
interaction terms seem to be significant. 
The estimated functions are; 
NRI = -374.6118 - 0.3667*D + 335.2078*CP 
(0.079)1 (28.130) 
-71.7595*EP - 0.0547*D*EP - 0.0482*D*U 
(8.396) (0.018) (0.036) 
+ 36.9942*U*CP + 13.6666*U*EP - 26.6872*U^ - 28.2935* (CP)^ 
(8.632) (2.804) (4,413) (6.793) 
+ 2.9962*(EP)2 + 246.1152*X1 (3.3) 
(1.203) (3.462) 
R^ = 0.992,^ MSE = 154.685.^ 
NRD = -215.4881 + 241.2301*CP - 29.4853*(CP)^ 
(39.067) (13.637) 
-1.7426*(EP)^+ 97.6060*X1 (3.4) 
(0.532) (4.527) 
R^ = 0.968, MSE = 216.073. 
^Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. 
2 2 
R is the coefficient of determination. 
^MSE is the mean square error. 
45 
2 
The equations estimated have coefficients of determination (R ) 
of 0.992 and 0.958, respectively, and all variables are significant at 
the five percent level except the D*U, which is significant at the 20 
percent level. Also, all signs of the coefficients are as expected. 
The depth to water (D) is significant at the one percent level in 
the net return for irrigation. An increase of the depth to water by one 
foot causes net return to decrease by 50.2 cents per acre with the 
1 2 base crop price and the base energy price. The difference between 
land classes one and two lies in the degree of erosion and in the slope 
of land, but it will be described with more detail in a later section. 
The amount of water applied (U) is also significant at the one 
percent level. It has a quadratic form which is highly significant. The 
net return elasticities with respect to the water applied are -0.371 
and -1.045 for land classes one and two, respectively. 
Being significant at the one percent level, the crop price level 
has a quadratic form for both irrigation and dryland farming. 
The energy price level also has a quadratic form for both irrigation 
and dryland farming, and is significant at the two percent level. The 
sign of the coefficients is negative within the range of other variables, 
as expected. 
1974-78 average prices of 10 crops including barley, corn, silage, 
legume hay, nonlegume hay, oats, sorghum, wheat, soybeans, and cotton. 
2 Doubling of 1975-79 average prices of four fuels including diesel, 
liquid petroleum gas, natural gas, and electricity. 
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Land class one has higher net return than land class two by $246 
per acre for irrigation and $98 per acre for dryland farming. This 
implies that land, class one has more value in irrigation. • 
The estimated net return functions for irrigation (Equation 3.3) 
and for dryland (Equation 3.4) do not include the time trend of net 
return due to technical change. They are modified by using the 
development of the crop yield coefficients.^ 
The yield function is of the form: 
Y(t) = Yo(t) + A(l-.8*(t)) . pF(t) (3,5) 
where 
Y(t) is the estimated average per acre yield of the crop in year t, 
YgCb) is the estimated average per acre yield on unfertilized land 
in year t, developed from a linear trend function, 
X(t) is the number of units of fertilizer applied to each acre of 
the crop in year t, 
PF(t) is the proportion of the acreage of the crop receiving 
fertilizer in year t, and 
t is yearà after 1949. 
The term X(t) is defined as; 
X(t) = PO(t) {in (P /P ) - In A - [In(-In.B)2}/ln.8 (3.6) 
where ^ 
In is the natural log of base e, 
P^ is the weighted price of a unit of fertilizer, 
P^ is the price of a unit of crop c, 
PO(t) is the proportion of the optimum rate of fertilizer applied 
• in year t. 
^They are developed by Stoecker (56). 
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Equation (3.6) represents an estimate of the optimum use of 
fertilizer obtained by equating the value of marginal product of 
fertilizer with its price. 
Using Equations (3.5) and (3.6), the total yield function for 
irrigation cropping, TYI^ which, the weighted average of the yield 
function for each crop, is estimated; 
TYI^ = 0.9663073 + 0.0067385*t (3.7) 
where 
t is years after 1985. 
Similarly, the total yield function for dryland cropping, TYD^, 
is estimated; ' 
TYD^ = 0.9723593 + 0.0055286*t (3.8) 
where 
t is years after 1985. 
Energy and crop prices are not fixed but changing over time, i.e., 
they are also functions of time. Let EPGR and CPGR be an energy price 
growth rate (annually) and a crop price growth rate (annually). Then 
the energy and crop price indexes are expressed as; 
EP(t) = EP*(1 + EPGR)^ (3.9) 
CP(t) = CP*(1 + CPGR)^ (3.10) 
Combining Equations (3.7), (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10) with the original 
net return functions, NRI shown in Equation (3.3) and NRD represented 
in Equation (3.4), yields the new net return functions, NRI^ and NRD^ with 
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time variable t. They are of the form: 
NRI^ = -374.6118 - 0.3667*0^ + 335.2078*(0.9663073 
+ 0.0067385*t)*CP*(l + CPGR)^ - 71.7595*EP*(1 + EPGR)^ 
- 0.0547*D*EP*(1 + EPGR)^ - 0.0482*D^*U^ 
+ 36.9942*U^*(0.9663073 + 0.0067384*t)*(P*(1+CPGR)^ 
+ 13.6666*U^*EP*(l+EPGR)t - 26.6872*(U^)^ 
- 28.2935*[(0.9663073+0.0067385*t)*CP*(1+CPGR)^ 
+ 2.9962*[EP*(l+EPGR)t]2 + 246.1152*X1, (3.11) 
NRDT^ = -215.4881 + 241.2301*(0.9723593 + 0.0055286*t)*CP*(1 + CPGR)^ 
- 29.4853*[(0.9723593 + 0.0055286*t)*CP*(1 + CPGR)^]^ 
t 2 
- 1.7426*[EP*(1 + EPGR) ] + 97.6060*X1 (3.12) 
Water relations 
The general form of the water relation (or equation of motion) 
for the social optimal model is as follows : 
. . 144 
VÎ - °t • "o \'-"i 
for 
t = 0,...,N"1 
and 
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where 
is the depth to water at the jth resource situation in time 
t, feet, 
is the amount of water applied per acre at the jth resource 
situation in time t, feet, 
is the irrigated acreage of the jth resource situation in 
time t, and 
a^, are the nonnegative coefficients. 
The water relation equations is derived by using the technical 
relationship between water inflow and outflow. 
144 144 
Z lA. E OCW. 
D 3 - D => = -^U * ^ ^ — 
t+1 t CS^ t 144 144 
Z TA. Z TA. 
i=j ^ j=l 3 
144 
Z [RR*IAj] 
- U * ^  WRR} (3,14) 
t 144 
Z TA. 
j=l ] 
where 
CS is the coefficient of storage, 
lAj is the irrigated acreage at the jth resource situation, 
TA. is the total acreage at the jth resource situation, j 
OCW. is the other consumption of water (commercial, industrial 
3 and domestic uses, excepted irrigation) at the jth resource 
situation, acre feet, 
RR is the recirculation rate 
WRR is the water recharge rate, feet per year. 
Equation (3.14) represents the technical relationship of groundwater 
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inflow and outflow. Using the data given in Table 3.3, it is 
calculated. 
-fi 144 . 
] = 2.5*10 * Z [0% *At ] " 0-4278 
j=l 
(3.15) 
Distribution of land 
The area using water from the Ogallala Aquifer is broken into 72 
water situations defined according to depth to water and the satuated 
thickness. Each situation has distinct irrigation costs because the 
energy needed for pumping water is different. 
The Conservation Needs Inventory reports acres of land by agri­
cultural capability class (41). it classifies the land into eight major 
classes with four subclasses reflecting susceptibility to erosion (e), 
subsoil exposure (s), drainage problem (w), and climatic conditions 
preventing normal crop production (c). Table 3.4 presents land classes 
one and two used in this study. Land class one contains almost all 
land suited for cultivation while land class two includes only class 
Ille land whose soil has severe limitations due to erosion. Hence, each 
crop produced in land class two has a lower yield than in land class one. 
Also, energy coefficients used for land class two irrigation are larger 
because of steep slopes. Land class one assumes a mix of gravity 
distribution systems and sprinklers. With an adjustment the acreages 
in 1985 are projected for the two land classes and 72 water situations. 
For convenience, the land with land class one and 0-50 feet of the 
depth to water is called "resource situation one" and the land with land 
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Table 3.3. Data for estimating the water relation equation 
Estimated value 
CS 0.15^ 
144 
I lA. 
j=l ^ 
3,294,691 acres 
144 
T. TA. 
j=l ] 
7,712,951 acres 
144 
Z OCW. 
j=l ] 
66,200 acre-feet^ 
RR 0.20^ 
WRR one inch or 0.083 feet^ 
^Texas Water Development Board (61-68J and Texas Department of Water 
Resources (59, 60). 
^Calculated from Texas Water Development Board (69). 
Table 3.4. Land group and subgroup aggregated to the two land quality 
classes 
Land quality class Inventory class-subclass 
1 I, II, III, IV (except IVe), V 
2 Ille^ 
^e indicates that the susceptibility to erosion is the dominant 
problem or hazard in their use. 
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class one and 50-100 feet of the depth to water "resource situation two" 
and so on as shown in Table 3.5. 
The discrete-time finite-horizon groundwater mining model 
An optimization model can treat time as discrete or continuous. 
Although the model built in Chapter II uses continuous-time, discrete-
time is used in its application because we do not have the continuous 
data and discrete-time is more suitable for agricultural production 
problems. 
There are two kinds of time horizon, finite and infinite. Because 
infinite-horizon is not realistic, a finite-horizon has been employed 
in this study. 
The social optimal model in Chapter II is reformulated in the 
following discrete-time model with a finite horizon: 
Max J(D^i, U^i, CP^, EP^, A^, XI, t) 
N-1 144 
= z rt Z NRI ](D ], u 
t=0 (1+r) j=l 
U^i, CP^, EP^, XI, t)*A^] 
subject to 
144 
1 (3.16) 
for 
j = 1,2 144, 
where 
NRI^^ is the net return function per acre for irrigation farming at 
the jth resource situation in time t, dollars. 
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Table 3.5. Distribution of land in 1985 
Resource 
situation 
Land 
class 
Water 
situation 
Depth to 
water 
(feet) 
Saturated 
thickness 
(feet) 
Acreage 
(acres) 
1 1 1 0-50 20-50 128,340 
2 1 2 50-100 20-50 158,826 
3 1 3 100-150 20-50 161,747 
4 1 4 150-200 20-50 161,747 
5 1 5 200-250 20-50 72,818 
6 1 6 250-300 20-50 72,818 
7 1 7 300-350 20-50 15,335 
8 1 8 350-400 20-50 15,335 
9 1 9 400-450 20-50 3,226 
10 1 10 0-50 50-100 31,272 
11 1 11 50-100 50-100 80,159 
12 1 12 100-150 50-100 116,406 
13 1 13 150-200 50-100 116,406 
14 1 14 200-250 50-100 118,824 
15 1 15 250-300 50-100 118,824 
16 1 16 300-350 50-100 47,469 
17 1 17 350-400 50-100 47,469 
18 1 18 400-450 50-100 14,007 
19 1 19 0-50 100-150 14,207 
20 1 20 50-100 100-150 28,482 
21 1 21 100-150 100-150 72,495 
22 1 22 150-200 100-150 72,495 
23 1 23 200-250 100-150 71,296 
24 1 24 250-300 100-150 71,296 
25 1 25 300-350 100-150 22,841 
26 1 26 350-400 100-150 22,841 
27 1 27 400-450 100-150 4,753 
28 1 28 0-50 150-200 14,207 
29 1 29 50-100 150-200 28,482 
30 1 30 100-150 150-200 72,495 
31 1 31 150-200 150-200 72,495 
32 1 32 200-250 150-200 71,296 
33 1 33 250-300 150-200 71,296 
34 1 34 300-350 150-200 22,841 
35 1 35 350-400 150-200 22,841 
36 1 36 400-450 150-200 4,753 
Table 3.5 (Continued) 
Resource 
situation 
Land 
class 
Water 
situation 
Depth to 
water 
(feet) 
Saturated 
thickness 
(feet) 
Acreage 
(acres) 
37 1 37 0-50 200-250 455 
38 1 38 50-100 200-250 1,014 
39 1 39 100-150 200-250 11,889 
40 1 40 150-200 200-250 11,889 
41 1 41 200-250 200-250 11,722 
42 1 42 250-300 200-250 11,722 
43 1 43 300-350 200-250 3,738 
44 1 44 350-400 200-250 3,738 
45 1 45 400-450 200-250 787 
46 1 46 0-50 250-300 455 
47 1 47 50-100 250-300 1,014 
48 1 48 100-150 250-300 11,889 
49 1 49 150-200 250-300 11,889 
50 1 50 200-250 250-300 11,722 
51 1 51 250-300 250-300 11,722 
52 1 52 300-350 250-300 3,738 
53 1 53 350-400 250-300 3,738 
54 1 54 400-450 250-300 787 
55 1 55 0-50 300-350 87 
56 1 56 50-100 300-350 191 
57 1 57 100-150 300-350 4,715 
58 1 58 150-200 300-350 4,715 
59 1 59 200-250 300-350 4,018 
60 1 60 250-300 300-350 4,018 
61 1 61 300-350 300-350 892 
62 1 62 350-400 300-350 892 
63 1 63 400-450 300-350 92 
64 1 64 0-50 350-400 87 
65 1 65 50-100 350-400 191 
66 1 66 100-150 350-400 4,715 
67 1 67 150-200 350-400 4,715 
68 1 68 200-250 350-400 4,018 
69 1 69 250-300 350-400 4,018 
70 1 70 300-350 350-400 892 
71 1 71 350-400 350-400 892 
72 1 72 400-450 350-400 72 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
Resource 
situation 
Land 
class 
Water 
situation 
Depth to 
water 
(feet) 
Saturated 
thickness 
(feet) 
Acreage 
(acres) 
73 2 1 0-50 20-50 85,877 
74 2 2 50-100 20-50 97,241 
75 2 3 100-150 20-50 83,595 
76 2 4 150-200 20-50 83,595 
77 2 5 200-250 20-50 26,010 
78 2 6 250-300 20-50 26,010 
79 2 7 300-350 20-50 3,842 
80 2 8 350-400 20-50 3,842 
81 2 9 400-450 20-50 553 
82 2 10 0-50 50-100 18,179 
83 2 11 50-100 50-100 40,924 
84 2 12 100-150 50-100 36,448 
85 2 13 150-200 50-100 36,448 
86 2 14 200-250 50-100 29,363 
87 2 15 250-300 50-100 29,363 
88 2 16 300-350 50-100 10,410 
89 2 17 350-400 50-100 10,410 
90 2 18 400-450 50-100 2,611 
91 2 19 0-50 100-150 10,132 
92 2 20 50-100 100-150 20,321 
93 2 21 100-150 100-150 21,003 
94 2 22 150-200 100-150 21,003 
95 2 23 200-250 100-150 15,809 
96 2 24 250-300 100-150 15,809 
97 2 25 300-350 100-150 4,420 
98 2 26 350-400 100-150 4,420 
99 2 27 400-450 100-150 848 
100 2 28 0-50 150-200 10,132 
101 2 29 50-100 150-200 20,321 
102 2 30 100-150 150-200 21,003 
103 2 31 150-200 150-200 21,003 
104 2 32 200-250 150-200 15,809 
105 2 33 250-300 150-200 15,809 
106 2 34 300-350 150-200 4,420 
107 2 35 350-400 150-200 4,420 
108 2 36 400-450 150-200 848 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
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(Continued) 
Land 
class 
Water 
situation 
Depth to Saturated 
water thickness 
(feet) (feet) 
Acreage 
(acres) 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
0-50 
50-100 
100-150 
150-200 
200-250 
250-300 
300-350 
350-400 
400-450 
0-50 
50-100 
100-150 
150-200 
200-250 
250-300 
300-350 
350-400 
400-450 
0-50 
50-100 
100-150 
150-200 
200-250 
250-300 
300-350 
350-400 
400-450 
200-250 
200-250 
200-250 
200-250 
200-250 
200-250 
200-250 
200-250 
200-250 
250-300 
250-300 
250-300 
250-300 
250-300 
250-300 
250-300 
250-300 
250-300 
350-400 
350-400 
350-400 
350-400 
350-400 
350-400 
350-400 
350-400 
350-400 
280 
625 
3,058 
3,058 
2,855 
2,855 
857 
857 
169 
280 
625 
3,058 
3,058 
2,855 
2,855 
857 
857 
169 
21 
45 
1,115 
1,115 
950 
950 
211 
211 
22 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
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65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
0-50 
50-100 
100-150 
150-200 
200-250 
250-300 
300-350 
350-400 
400-450 
400-450 
400-450 
400-450 
400-450 
400-450 
400-450 
400-450 
400-450 
400-450 
21 
45 
1,115 
1,115 
950 
950 
211 
211 
22 
3,286,347 
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is the depth to water at the jth resource situation in time t, 
feet, 
is the amount of water applied per acre at the jth resource 
situation in time t, feet, 
CP^ is the crop price index in time t, 
EP^ is the energy price index in time t, 
is the irrigated acreage at the jth resource situation, acre, 
a^, is the coefficients for the water relation equation, 
r is the discount rate, 
t is time; 1,2,...,N-1, and 
XI is the dummy variable; one for land class one, zero for land class 
two. 
, (j = 1,2,...,144) are control variables, (j= 1,2,...,144) are 
state variables, and EP^, CP^, r, XI and (j = 1,2,...,144) are exogenous 
variables. 
NRI^^ is expressed from the regression estimation; 
(D^i, U^i, CP^, EP^, XI, t) 
= bg + b^*D^ + b2*TYI^*CP^ + bytEP^ + b^*D^^*EP^ 
+ b_*D^]*U^] + b.*U^^*TYI^*CP. + b_*U.^*EP. 
5 t t  6 t  t t  7  t  t  
+ bo*U ]*U ] + b *TYI *TYI *CP *CP 
+ b^Q*EP^*EP^ + b^^*Xl (3.17) 
Here 
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where 
bg = -374.6118, 
= -0.3667, 
bg = 335.2078, 
b^ = -71.7595, 
b^ = -0.0547, 
bg = -0.0482, 
bg = 36.9942, 
b^ = 13.6666, 
bg = -26.6872, 
bg = -28.2935, 
bj^Q = 2.9962, 
b^^ = 246.1152, and 
TYI^ = 0.9663073 + 0.0067385*t (t = 0 for year 1985). 
The coefficients of the water relation are estimated as = 
2.5*10~® and = 0.4278. 
Solving for the above discrete-time finite-horizon problem^, we get 
the system of three equations: 
- 4 - —^ • a • Ibi+b -EP ] (3.18) 
(1+r) 
!lt - - 2É7 H- + bs'St + be'CPt-I ^ "y-EPt-l) (3-19) 
^The solution algorithm for discrete-time finite-horizon control 
problem is presented in Appendix C. 
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Çt+I = + a^-I-A'^.U^ - a^-i (3.20) 
where 
is the co-state variable or the shadow price associated with 
water relation Equation (3.15), 
•V _ m 1 Ti 2 , 144, 
— I.f J , 
2t = '"t"' 
£t - :°t'' 
1 2 144 T 
A = [A , A ,...,A ] , and 
1 = [I, I,..., I]"^. 
Given the initial level of depth to water, (j = 1,2,...,144), 
the system of (3.18), (3.19) and (3.20) can be solved and it gives us 
i* the optimal level of water use for each year, (j = 1,2,...,144; 
t = 0,1,...,N-1) and the level of the depth to water, (j = 1,2,...,144; 
i* t = 0,1,...,N-1) associated with . 
However, the problem is not so simple. Because, if the amount of 
water applied declines then yield will fall, irrigation is not profitable 
and a transfer to dryland cropping results. Therefore, the net returns 
from irrigation in the objective function should be replaced by the 
net return from dryland when it is converted to dryland cropping. 
Hence, the dryland conversion constraint should be added; 
^ T denotes the transpose of a vector or matrix. 
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NRI^] > NRD^] 
otherwise = 0 and NRI^^ is replaced by NRD^^ (3.21) 
NRD^^ is the net return function per acre for dryland farming at jth 
resource situation in time t. NRD^^ is estimated and expressed as 
follows : 
NRD^^ (CP^, EP^, XI, t) 
(Cq +C *TYD *CP + C *TYD *TYD *CP *CP 
+ C2*EP^*EP^ + C^*X1 (3.22) 
where = -215.4881, = 241.2301, = -29.4853, = -1.7426, 
= 97.6060, and TYD^ = 0.9723593 + 0.0055286*t (t = 0 for year 
1985). This constraint is applied only for the initial year since 
there is a time lag for transferring to dryland cropping in a real 
world. 
Also, the water can not be pumped if the depth to water reaches 
the maximum depth to water i.e., the bottom of the aquifer. Therefore, 
the depth to water constraints should be added: 
< DMAX^ 
otherwise = 0 and NRI^ is replaced by NRD^ (3.23) 
Also, we add the irrigated acreage constraint (3.24): 
where ST is the saturated thickness in feet. This constraint makes the 
(3.24) 
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water situation data's distribution more smooth since the irrigated 
acreage changes every period according to the change in the depth to 
water. 
Now we can get the solution using the additional constraints 
(3.21), (3.23), and (3.24). Given the initial level of depth to water 
the system of three Equations (3.18), (3.19), and (3.20) can be solved 
and it yields the optimal level of water use for each year and the level 
of the depth to water during the years.^ 
The solution is not optimal in a strict sense since the additional 
state variables, the irrigated acreages, are included not in the system of 
equations but in the constraint Equation (3.24). However, the co-state 
variable associated with the irrigated acreage is small enough to ignore it. 
The differential dynamic program technique (Jacobson and Mayne (36)) is 
applied to get the strict solution for a number of runs and obtained 
nearly identical results to those presented here. 
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CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: SOCIAL OPTIMAL 
VERSUS FREE MARKET SOLUTION 
The results of the study are presented and analyzed in this 
chapter for the five model alternatives. The results for policy simulation 
are reported in Chapter V. Alternative A represents normal level of 
energy and crop prices and gives the base solution. Alternative B, 
C, D, and E incorporate high energy prices, low energy prices, low crop 
prices, and a high discount rate, respectively.^ In this study, the 
variables discussed are the irrigated acreage, the use of water resource, 
the level of the water table, net farm incomes, and user costs. Further­
more, each alternative has both the social optimal and free market 
solution for a total of five solutions. A comparison of their solutions 
yields one of the major results of this study together with the policy 
analysis in the next chapter. 
Alternative A has doubling the 1975-79 average prices of the four fuels 
(including diesel, liquid petroleum gas, natural gas, and electricity), 
with three percent of its annual growth rate, doubling of the 1974-78 average 
prices of 10 crops (including barley, corn, silage, legume hay, nonlegume 
hay, oats, sorghum, wheat, soybeans, and cotton) with a half percent of 
its annual growth rate. These energy prices and crop prices are called 
base prices. Alternative B is 200 percent of the base energy price level 
with five percent of its annual growth rate and 100 percent of the base 
crop price level with a half percent of its annual growth rate. Alterna­
tive C is 50 percent of the base energy price level with one percent 
of its annual growth rate and the base crop price level with a half 
percent of its annual growth rate. Alternative D is the base energy 
price level with three percent of its annual growth rate and the base 
energy price level with three percent of its annual growth rate and 50 
percent of the base crop price level with no annual growth. Alternative 
A, B, C, and D have the same discount rate, i.e., seven percent. Finally, 
Alternative E incorporates the base energy price level with three percent 
of its annual growth rate, the base crop price level with a half percent 
of its annual growth rate, and a higher discount rate, i.e., 15 
percent. 
64 
Irrigated Acreage 
Irrigated acreages are analyzed in two aspects: total irrigated 
acreages over 21 years and the time paths of irrigated acreages. The 
pattern of total irrigated acreages is compared under five alternatives 
and under the social optimal and free market model. Then, similar 
analyses are done for time paths of irrigated acreage. 
Total irrigated acreages 
Table 4.1 reports total irrigated acreage over 21 years for the 
social optimal and free market model. Comparing the three alternatives 
A, B, and C, the largest portion of land is irrigated under the low 
energy price alternative C and the smallest under the high energy price 
Table 4.1. Total irrigated acreage for five model alternatives 
Total Irrigated Acreage 
Model 
alternative 
Social optimal 
solution 
Free market 
solution 
(million acres) 
A 20.50 19.81 
B 15.30 14.83 
C 23.19 22.37 
D 6.65 6.34 
E 20.21 19.81 
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alternative B. Also, the irrigated acreage is at a very low level 
under the low crop price alternative D and at a little lower level 
under the high discount rate alternative E than the base solution 
alternative A. In short, the higher the energy prices and the lower 
the crop prices, the smaller the total irrigated acreage is because high 
energy prices and low crop prices make the irrigation unprofitable. 
The free market solution has a smaller total irrigated acreage 
than the social optimal solution. This is due to the fact that an 
over-utilization of water in the free market solution makes irrigation 
less profitable in later years. 
Time paths of irrigated acreages 
Time paths of irrigated acreages under base solution alternative A 
are depicted in Figure 4.1 and reported in Table 4.2 under all five 
alternatives for both the social optimal and the free market solution. 
The irrigated acreages decrease slowly and approach the fixed 
level for both solutions. Also, the irrigated acreage in the free 
market solution is smaller than the social optimal solution as shown 
in the total irrigated acreages. 
Usage of the Water Resource 
How much water will be used in total and per acre is one of our 
major concerns. First, the pattern of total water use is compared 
under the five model alternatives, and then similar analyses are done for 
per acre water use. 
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Figure 4.1. Time paths of irrigated acreages under alternative A with 
the social optimal and the free market solution 
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Table 4.2. Irrigated acreages with the social optimal and the free 
market solution 
Irrigated Acreage 
Social optimal Free market 
solution solution 
(million acres) 
Alternative A 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2005 
TOTAL 
Alternative B 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2005 
TOTAL 
Alternative C 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2005 
TOTAL 
Alternative D 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2005 
TOTAL 
2.37 
1.18 
0.93 
0.56 
0.51 
20.50 
1.77 
0.87 
0.70 
0.55 
0.37 
15.30 
2.70 
1.33 
1.05 
0.63 
0.58 
23.19 
0.49 
0.45 
0.19 
0.19 
0.19 
6.65 
2.37 
1.15 
0.89 
0.55 
0.49 
19.81 
1.77 
0.85 
0.68 
0.40 
0.36 
14.83 
2.70 
1.30 
1.01 
0.62 
0.56 
22.37 
0.49 
0.44 
0.19 
0.19 
0.19 
6.34 
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Table 4.2 (Continued) 
Irrigated Acreage 
Year Social optimal Free market 
solution solution 
(million acres) 
Alternative E 
1985 2.37 2.37 
1990 1.17 1.15 
1995 0.91 0.89 
2000 0.55 0.55 
2005 0.50 0.49 
TOTAL 20.21 19.81 
Total water use 
The total amount of water used obviously is an important sign of 
the degree of groundwater aquifer depletion. Table 4.3 projects the 
total water use in 21 years with five alternatives for the social 
optimal and the free market model. 
Table 4.3. Total water use for five model alternatives 
Model 
alternative 
Total Water Use 
Social optimal 
solution 
(million acre-
Free market 
solution 
-feet) 
A 30.42 31.61 
B 29.72 30.78 
C 30.11 31.33 
D 5.73 6.19 
E 31.19 31.61 
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The free market solution utilizes more water than the social 
optimal solution for all alternatives. Water is used less with the 
low crop prices alternative D since irrigation is less profitable under 
the low crop prices. Also, more water is used with the high discount 
rate (alternative E). This is because of an early depletion of ground­
water with the high interest rate. 
The patterns for annual water use under alternative A are depicted 
in Figure 4.2. Identical to the total water use, the free market solu­
tion utilizes more water than the social optimal solution. They show a 
downward trend with declines in the beginning periods and fixed 
levels in the later periods.. The reasons for the downward 
trend of the water utilization path might be; (1) the positive 
discount rate makes farmers produce more with the larger amount of 
water in the beginning periods since the net return is time-discounted, 
and (2) the irrigated acreage decreases as the water table declines 
making the water use fall. 
Per acre water use 
Optimal levels of the per acre water use by resource situations^ 
for five alternatives are reported in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. Only 
nine resource situations (from 64 to 72) are reported in this table 
and the rest are listed in Appendix D. Better resource situations, such 
^The classification of the resource situation is mentioned in 
Chapter III and its distribution is listed in Table 3.5. 
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Free market 
Social optimal 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Year 
Annual water use under alternative A with the social optimal 
and the free market solution 
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Table 4.4. Annual per acre water use for five model alternatives (the 
social optimal solution) 
Resource Situation 
alterna- gg 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 
(feet per acre) 
19853 
A 1.460 1.415 1.370 1.325 1.280 1.235 1.190 
B 1.702 1.657 1.612 1,566 1.521 -
C 1.340 1.295 1.249 1.204 1.159 1.114 1.069 1.024 0.979 
D 0.791 0.746 ——————— 
E 1.520 1.475 1.430 1.385 1.340 1.295 1.249 
2005^ 
A 1.944 1.899 1.854 1.809 1.763 1.718 1.673 
B 2.791 2.746 2.701 2.656 2.611 - - - -
C 1.656 1.611 1.565 1.520 1.475 1.430 1.385 1.340 1.294 
D 1,075 1.030 — — — — — 
E 2.008 1.962 1.917 1.872 1.827 1.782 1.737 
^For simplicity, levels of annual per acre water use are listed for 
the initial year (1985) and terminal year (2005). 
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Table 4.5. Annual per acre water use for five model alternatives (the 
free market solution) 
Model Resource Situation 
alterna­
tive 
- 64 65 66 67 
(feet 
68 69 
per acre) 
70 71 72 
1985* 
A 1.573 1.528 1.483 1.438 1.392 1.347 1.302 - -
B 1.829 1.784 1-379 1.694 1.648 - - - -
C 1.445 1.400 1.355 1.310 1.264 1.219 1.174 1.129 1.084 
D 0.903 0.858 - - - - - - -
E 1.573 1.528 1.483 1,438 1.392 1.347 1.302 - -
2005* 
A 2.065 2.020 1.974 1.929 1.884 1.839 1.794 - -
B 2.963 2.918 2.873 2.828 2.782 - - - -
C 1.759 1.714 1.669 1.624 1.578 1.533 1.488 1.443 1.398 
D 1.197 1.152 - - - - - - -
E 2.065 2.020 1.974 1.929 1.884 1.839 1.794 - — 
^For simplicity, levels of annual per acre water use are listed 
for the initial year (1985) and terminal year (2005). 
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as resource situation 64, have a higher level of per acre water use 
while worse resource situations, such as 72, have no water use or 
lower per acre water use. The better the resource situation the higher 
the marginal productivity and the lower the marginal cost. This 
results in a higher rate of water use for the better resource situa­
tion . 
The optimal paths of per acre water use show an upward trend. 
This might be due to: (1) Yields show an increasing trend due to 
technological changes , therefore use of more per acre water in* the later 
periods is profitable; and (2) the stock externality, which implies in­
creased water cost in the next years due to the increment of water 
use in this year, is quite large, thus, it makes the. irrigators use 
more water in the later periods. 
The high energy price alternative B has higher annual per acre 
water use, and the low energy price alternative C and the low crop 
price alternative D have lower annual per acre water use. The high dis­
count rate alternative E shows a little higher water use. The comparison 
of the social optimal to the free market solution shows that the*-' -
latter always has a higher rate of water use for both total and per acre 
use than the former. 
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Decline of the Water Table 
The level of the water table is an indicator of the groundwater stock 
in the aquifer; consequently, the decline of the water table is an.impùrtant 
measure of water use. With the low crop prices (alternative D) the decline 
of the water table is smaller. With the high discount: rate (alternative 
E) the decline is larger than with the normal crop prices and discount rate 
(alternative A). Obviously the free market solution has a greater decline 
of the water table than the social optimal solution. The total decline 
of the water level is reported in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6. Total decline of the water table 1985-2005 for five model 
alternatives 
Model 
alternative 
Social optimal Free market 
solution solution 
(feet/acre) 
A 65.20 68.10 
B 63.26 65.83 
C 64.55 67.53 
D 5.28 6.37 
E 67.09 68.09 
The depths to the water table under alternative A in the resource 
situation 10 are depicted in Figure 4.3. The water table declines 
continuously with the rapid decline at the beginning. The free market 
solutions causes a.-greater rate of decline. 
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Free market 
Social optimal 
a 
2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Year 
Figure 4.3. Level of the depth to water (feet) in the resource 
situation ten under alternative A 
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Farm Incomes 
Goals or objectives of water management policy have been to in­
crease net farm income while conserving water resources. Changes in net 
farm income have a great impact on the farm economy; consequently, level 
of net farm income is an important factor in water management policies. 
Net farm incomes are defined as the total gross revenue minus the 
total cost. Table 4.7 reports the total net farm income and the total 
net present value of farm income for the five model alternatives. It is 
obvious that under the low energy price alternative C the total net 
farm income is the highest and under the low crop prices alternative D it 
is the lowest. As a matter of course, both the total net farm income and 
total net present value of farm income are greater in the social optimal 
solution than those in the free market solution. Even at the normal 
levels of crop and energy prices (alternative A)., there are differences 
of 70.3 million dollars in the total net farm income and 34.0 million 
dollars in the total net present value of farm income. They are larger 
under the low energy prices alternative C and smaller under the low crop 
prices alternative D. More comparisons between two solutions are made 
later in this chapter. 
The annual net farm income and the annual net present values of the 
farm income in the initial year (1985) and in the terminal year (2005) 
are reported in Table 4.8. Annual net farm incomes under the social 
optimal model are larger than incomes under the free market model in 1985 
but it is reversed in 2005. Annual net farm incomes decrease drastically 
Table 4.7. Total net farm income from both irrigation and dryland farming for five model 
alternatives 
Social Optimal Solution Free Market Solution 
Model Total net Total net Total net Total net 
alterna­ farm present value of farm present value of 
tive income farm income income farm income 
(millions of 1985 dollars) 
A 17,935 9,828 17,864 9,794 
B 15,661 8,669 15,633 8,656 
C 19,015 10,437 18,906 10,384 
D 4,781 2,575 4,780 2,575 
E 17,904 6,117 17,864 6,108 
Table 4.8. Annual net farm income from both irrigation and dryland farming for five 
model alternatives 
Social Optimal Solution Free Market Solution 
Model Annual net Annual net Annual net Annual net 
alterna- farm present value of farm present value of 
tive income farm income income farm income 
(millions of 1985 dollars) 
1985 
A 899.2 899.2 900.0 900.0 
B 787.6 787.6 788.4 788.4 
C 974.0 974.0 974.8 974.8 
D 204.0 204.0 204.1 204.1 
E 899.9 899.9 900.0 900.0 
2005 
A 895.5 231.4 893.4 230.9 
B 725.6 187.5 724.6 187.2 
C 947.3 244.8 944.0 244.0 
D 249.8 64.5 249.8 64.5 
E 894.2 54.6 893.5 54.6 
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in the beginning years and then increases slowly except alternative D, 
when it increases slowly over all periods. Annual net present 
values of farm income decrease continuously over all periods, i.e., with 
more than a 10percent inflation rate, annual net farm incomes (including 
incomes from both the irrigation and dryland production) will decline in 
each year. 
Also, time paths of annual net farm incomes, annual net farm in­
come per-acre, and annual net present values of farm income under the 
base solution alternative A are represented in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. 
The first two time paths have upward trends and the third time path has 
a downward trend. Net income in the first two is not time-discounted 
and technological progress brings the upward trends. Net income in 
the third one is time-discounted at a It) percent rate and causes 
the downward trend. 
User Costs 
User costs are defined as an opportunity cost which represent 
the values of profits foregone in the future due to an increase in 
resources (for example, water) use in current and intervening periods. 
User costs are the adjustment in resource prices that determine the 
extraction rate of natural resources so that optimal resource uses 
over time are obtained. 
One of the major advantages in using optimal control theory is to 
get the exact time path of user costs easily. Optimal control theory 
solutions provide time paths of user costs automatically for all model 
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alternatives. 
Table 4.9 reports user costs per acre in the initial year (1985) 
and in the terminal year (2005).^ They are highest under high energy 
price alternative B and lowest under high discount rate alternative E. 
Under high energy prices or low discount rates an opportunity cost 
for an increment of resource stocks is larger and this makes user costs 
high. For the free market situation, users of common property resources 
do not consider the value of the resource stock. Therefore, user 
costs are zero under the free market model. 
For all alternatives, user costs per acre decline, slowly since an 
increment of resource stocks influence the later periods' production, 
i.e., because it has less value. Time paths of user costs per acre ate 
depicted in Figure 4.7 only for base model alternative A. It declines 
2 
steadily so that it approaches zero in 90 years. 
Social Versus Private Optimal 
Solution 
An important result of this study is the comparison between " " ' 
the social and the free market solution. Groundwater belongs to the 
common property resource and therefore an inefficient water allocation 
results without regulations by the federal government or agreements by 
all users of groundwater. Only if all users of water try to maximize 
^Time paths of user costs per acre for all alternatives are listed 
in Appendix E. 
2 
This time horizon was arbitrarily chosen so that the analysis would 
give results approximately an infinite life horizon. 
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Table 4.9. User costs per acre for five model alternatives 
Social Free 
optimal market 
model model 
(dollars/acre) 
1985 
A 7.10 0 
B 10.02 0 
C 6.10 0 
D 7.10 0 
E 3.57 0 
2005 
A 1.81 0 
B 2.52 0 
C 1.57 0 
D 1.81 0 
E 0.22 0 
Model 
alterna­
tive 
85 
10.0 
8.0 -
a 
4.0 
2 . 0  
Social optimal 
Free market 
0 . 0  
2005 1995 2000 1985 1990 
Year 
Figure 4.7. Time paths of user costs per acre under alternative A 
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their joint net return subject to water relation constraints, will the 
optimal intertemporal and within-group allocation be realized. The 
social optimal solution in this study implies this joint benefit maxi­
mization problem, while the free market solution represents the outcome 
from each user's own benefit maximization problem. Net farm incomes 
and water table levels are basic elements- in the comparison of the 
two solutions. They are summarized in Table 4.10. The gains realized 
from the social .optimal policy and the free market policy include 
both the net farm income and the conservation of ground water resources. 
With the free market policy the region will lose 70 million dollars in 
net farm income and 2.9 feet of its water table under the base solution 
alternative A. With high energy prices (alternative C) the economic 
loss is 110 million dollars which is the largest among all alternatives, 
and there is three feet per acre of excessive depletion of water stock. 
With low crop prices (alternative D) economic losses and excessive 
depletion of water stock are quite small, but still the social optimal 
solution is better than the free market solution. Also, the high discount 
rate (alternative E) makes the losses small. Thus, the social optimal 
policy leads to the gains both in net incomes and in water resource 
conservation. 
Table 4.10. A comparison of the social optimal solution to the free market solution 
Free Market (F) Economic Losses (S-F) Social Optimal (S) 
Model Total Total net Total Total net Total Total net 
alterna- net present value net present value net present value 
tive farm of farm of farm of 
income farm income income farm income income farm income 
(billions of 1985 dollars) 
Excessive 
depletion of 
water stock 
due to 
commonality 
(feet/acre) 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
17.93 
15.66 
19.02 
4.78 
17.90 
9.83 
8.67 
10.44 
2.56 
6.12 
17.86 
15.63 
18.91 
4.78 
17.86 
9.79 
8.66 
10.38 
2.56 
6.11 
0.07 
0.03 
0.11 
_b 
0.04 
0.04 
0.01 
0.06 
_b 
0.01 
2.9 
2 . 6  
3.0 
1.1 
1.0 
^The total decline of the water table for the free market solution minus that for the 
social solution. 
^Economic losses are less than one million dollars. 
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CHAPTER V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS; 
POLICY SIMULATIONS 
Some of this study's major results are simulations to evaluate 
the efficiency of the allocation (both intertemporal and within-group) 
of water resources under diverse policies. Three alternative policies 
for achieving social optimal allocations of resources are examined 
and experimental results are presented. These policies simulated 
include various taxation policies and quota policies. 
Policies for Achieving Social Optimal 
Allocation of Resources 
As shown in the previous chapter, there is a small but definite 
divergence between the social optimal and free market allocations of 
water. Market forces lead to the over-utilization of the resources and 
this results in welfare loss. Therefore, some policies may. bç required 
to attain the social optimal allocation of resources, i.e., an internaliza 
tion of commonality is needed.^ In general, there are two kinds of 
policies: fiscal policies, which include taxes and subsidies, and direct 
controls such as a quota policy. 
The "bribes versus charges" controversy is widely known in the 
literature of environmental economics and polution control. Baumol and 
^The most effective policy would achieve the socially optimal alloca­
tion which puts an upper limit on the benefits of any policy selected. 
Such a policy may not be feasible but the benefits of a policy selected 
must be greater than the costs of policy implementation and administration 
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Oates conclude, that though the bribe (a subsidy program) does reduce 
pollution emissions of each firm by itself it may increase emissions 
from their unregulated level by inducing the entry of more polluting firms 
(4, p. 182). Also, a tax program brings a transfer of welfare from the tax­
payer (externality-generator) to the government, while a subsidy 
does the reverse. In our groundwater mining model, a subsidy program 
leads to more total water use even though water use per acre is 
reduced since more land will be irrigated beyond the optimal level 
of irrigated acreges to get subsidies. 
One other controversy is the problem of taxes versus direct 
controls. Generally, tax policies have efficiency advantages over 
direct controls, but there are some exceptions. First, exogenous 
influences such as meteorological conditions create emergency situations 
and tax policies are ill-suited to such short-term crises. Also, 
the response to a given rate of tax is uncertain. In terms of 
environmental regulations, Baumol and Oates say that in the presence 
of stochastic influences, taxes may sometimes be more costly to 
society than direct controls (Baumol and Oates (4, p. 161)). Second, 
it is very difficult to change tax rates on short notice as shown in 
the long process to reform past tax systems. 
In choosing a policy from a number of control policies, costs 
along with efficiency and effectiveness must be considered important 
factors. Fisher and Peterson note that 
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The objective for selecting a policy among those that are 
politically feasible then would presumably be to minimize 
administrative costs, including the costs of obtaining 
information and the costs of adjustment in the direction of 
the optimum (21, p. 13). 
In experiments three alternative policies, in addition to an 
exact social optimal policy and a free market policy, are examined. 
Two kinds of taxation policies are considered; one is a unit tax 
per acre, when the land is irrigated, changing every five years, and 
the other is a unit tax per acre at a fixed rate over all periods. 
Also, a direct policy and a quota policy, which allow farmers to 
use ten percent of the remaining water stock every five years, 
are studied. 
Social Optimal Policy 
As mentioned in Chapter II, social optimal allocation of water 
resources is realized only if they are used at the rate at which 
the marginal value product of water equals the sum of the marginal 
cost of water and the user cost (the marginal social cost) associated 
with the water stock. This implies that a social optimum is attained 
when policy makers levy a unit tax equivalent to the user cost or 
control the amount of water directly at the level of water use for 
each period. A subsidy policy, in which some amount of money is 
given to the producers who follow the assigned level of 
water use, will be possible. However, this policy may increase the 
total irrigated acres and violate the necessary condition for 
91 
optimality. The most difficult thing in implementing the optimal 
tax or quota policies is a requirement of frequent calculations of 
optimal tax and quota levels. Even if the levels are calculated 
in advance, they should be recalculated frequently to adjust for 
stochastic changes. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the levels of optimal 
taxes and quotas under base price levels of crops and energy. 
The optimal levels of quota are different for each resource situation. 
Better resource situations are allowed to use more water while worse 
resource situations use less water. (For more detailed results see 
Appendix D.) The levels of important variables realized by optimal 
policies such as total water use, total irrigated acreage, total net 
farm income, total net present value of farm income, and decline of 
the water table are summarized in Table 5.3. 
Free Market Policy 
With a laissez faire policy, each producer tries to maximize 
his own profit, and an equilibrium will be attained at the point 
where the marginal value product of water equals the marginal cost 
of water. One advantage of this policy is that no administrative 
or management costs are required. When administrative costs such as 
those incurred in managing and enforcing a policy of this sort are 
greater than benefits realized by the policy, then no policy (free 
market policy) will be the best policy. 
Table 5.4 shows the levels of important variables under the free 
market policy. Compared to the social optimal policy, it indicates a 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Tabli 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
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5.1. Optimal tax rates 
Optimal tax 
rate 
(dollars/acre) 
Year 
Optimal tax 
rate 
(dollars/acre) 
7.10 1996 3.18 
6.01 1997 2.99 
5.63 1998 2.81 
5.29 1999 2.64 
4.96 2000 2.47 
4.65 2001 2.32 
4.37 2002 2.18 
4.10 2003 2.05 
3.85 2004 1.93 
3.61 2005 1.81 
3.39 
5.2. Optimal quota levels 
Total water use 
(million acre Year 
Total water use 
(million acre 
feet) feet) 
3.17 1996 1.38 
1.88 1997 1.33 
1.83 1998 1.29 
1.77 1999 1.25 
1.72 2000 0.93 
1.67 2001 0.93 
1.62 2002 0.92 
1.57 2003 0.92 
1.52 2004 0.92 
1.47 2005 0.91 
1.42 
Table 5.3. Total water use, total irrigated acreage, total net farm income, total net 
present value of farm income, and total decline of the water table: the social 
optimal policy 
Total water Total Total net Total net present Total decline of 
use® irrigated farm income value of ^ ^  water 
(million acreage^ (million farm income ' table^ 
acre feet) (million acres) dollars) (million dollars) (feet) 
30.42 20.50 17,934.7 9,828.4 65.20 
^Totalled over 21 years. 
10 percent discount rate is employed. 
Table 5.4. Total water use, total irrigated acreage, total net farm income, total net 
present value of farm income, and total decline of the water table : the free 
market policy 
Total water Total Total net Total net present Total decline of 
use^ irrigated farm income value of , water 
(million acreage^ (million _ . & y D farm income table^ 
acre feet) (million acres) dollars) (million dollars) (feet) 
31.61 19.81 17,864.4 9,794.4 68.09 
^Totalled over 21 years. 
10 percent discount rate is employed. 
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lower total net farm income and a larger depletion of the water stock. 
Flexible Taxation Policy 
The flexible taxation policy consists of a unit tax per irrigated 
acre, which is constant over five years. The flexible taxation policy 
reduces administrative and management costs incurred in enforcing a 
policy. Tax rates are determined in advance, and fixed for the 
following five years. Therefore, it reduces administrative and 
management costs on quite a large scale. Also, this flexible taxation 
policy gives producers greater certainty in taxation schedules. If 
tax rates vary each year, producers are limited in making 
decisions as to whether they should irrigate or not and how much 
water they should use. 
In experiments, five year averages of user costs are levied.^ The 
results are summarized in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Table 5.5 reports only 
nine resource situations (from 64 to 72) and the rest are given in 
Appendix D. Under the flexible taxation policy annual per acre water 
use in the initial year lies between the social optimal and the free 
market policies and it is the highest in the terminal year. Sur­
prisingly, the flexible taxation policy shows total net farm income 
very similar to that of the social optimal policy. Total decline 
of the water table is a little larger, but almost the same as that 
of the social optimal policy. These results prove that five year 
^Note that same rates of unit taxes are used for all resource 
situations since they have same levels of user costs. 
96 
Table 5.5. Annual per acre water use under social optimal, flexible 
taxation, and free market policies 
Type Resource Situation 
of 
policy 
64 65 66 67 68 
(feet per acre) 
69 70 71 72 
1985^ 
Social 
optimal 1.460 1.415 1.370 1.325 1.280 1.235 1.190 - -
Flexible 
taxation 1.474 1.429 1.383 1.338 1.293 1.248 1.203 - -
Free 
market 1.573 1.528 1.483 1.438 1.392 1.347 1.302 - -
2005^ 
Social 
optimal 1.944 1.899 1.854 1.809 1.763 1.718 1.673 - -
Flexible 
taxation 2.067 2.022 1.977 1.932 1.887 1.842 1.796 - -
Free 
market 2.065 2.020 1.974 1.949 1.884 1.839 1.794 - -
^or simplicity, levels of annual per acre water use are listed 
for the initial year (1985) and the terminal year (2005). 
Table 5.5. Several important values under social optimal, flexible 
taxation, and free market policies 
Total water Total Total net Total net Total 
Type use irrigated farm present value decline 
of (million acreage income of farm income of 
policy acre (million (million (million water table 
feet) acres) dollars) dollars) (feet) 
Social 
optimal 30.42 20.50 17,934.7 9,828.4 65.20 
Flexible 
taxation 30.47 20.49 17,933.7 9,827.7 65.18 
Free 
market 31.61 19.81 17,864.4 9,794,4 68.09 
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average tax rates are enough to achieve the social optimal allocation and 
it reduces administrative and management costs rapidly. 
Fixed Taxation Policy 
Next, tax rates are fixed over all periods and we call this policy 
a fixed taxation policy. This would reduce administrative and manage­
ment costs on a large scale, but this may decrease efficiency. Also, 
producers will feel certain in planning their production patterns and 
water schedules. 
Experimental results under the fixed taxation policy are reported 
in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. An average of user costs over 21 years is 
used as the fixed tax rate. Only nine resource situations (from 64 
to 72) are reported in Table 5.7 and the rest are listed in Appendix 
D. Different from the flexible taxation policy, annual per acre 
water use in the initial year under the fixed taxation policy drops 
between the social optimal and the free market policies, but it is the 
lowest in the terminal year. If the fixed tax rate is determined at 
a lower rate, it will be higher in the terminal year. 
In Table 5.8, both total water use and total decline of water 
table are smallest under the fixed taxation policy. Total net farm 
income lies between the social optimal and free market policies, but 
it is smaller than that of the flexible taxation policy. This shows 
us that total net farm income declines greatly even though the resource 
stock is conserved slightly and administrative and management costs 
decrease greatly. 
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Table 5.7. Annual per acre water use under social optimal, fixed 
taxation, and free market policies 
Tune of Resource Situation 
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 policy ,_ ^ , (feet per acre) 
Social 
optimal 1.460 1.415 1.370 
1985 
1.325 
a 
1.280 1.235 1.190 
Fixed 
taxation 1.507 1.462 1.417 1.372 1.327 1.281 1.236 - — 
Free 
market 1.573 1.528 1.483 1.438 1.392 1.347 1.302 _ 
Social 
optimal 1.944 1.899 1.854 
2005 
1.809 
a 
1.763 1.718 1.673 
fixed 
taxation 1.813 1.768 1.723 1.678 1.633 1.588 1.542 - -
Free 
market 2.065 2.020 1.974 1.929 1.884 1.839 1.794 - -
^For simplicity, levels of annual per acre water use are listed for the 
initial year (1985) and the terminal year (2005) . 
Table 5.8. Several important values under social optimal, fixed taxation, 
and free market policies 
Total Total Total net Total net Total decline 
Type of water irrigated farm present value of 
policy use acreage income of farm income water 
(million (million (million (million table 
acre feet) acres) dollars) dollars) (feet) 
Social 
optimal 30.42 20.50 17,934.7 9,828.4 65.20 
Fixed 
taxation 30.19 20.40 17,920.7 9,821.0 64.79 
Free 
market 31.61 19.81 17,864.4 9,794.4 68.09 
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The flexible taxation policy is superior to the fixed taxation 
policy but it depends upon the difference in administrative and manage­
ment costs between the two policies. 
Quota Policy 
The final policy employed in our experiments is a quota policy, 
which restricts water use within some percentage of the remaining stock. 
A violation would result in a fine or revocation of the ground­
water pumping license. When the quotas are calculated and vary 
every year, then this is one of the social optimal policies. Here, 
the quota levels are calculated with five-year intervals which are 
10 percent of the remaining water stock. Such a policy is currently 
being implemented in Nebraska. 
Table 5.9 reports annual per acre water use under the quota 
policy. For comparison, only the same resource situations with flexible 
and fixed taxation policies are reported while annual per acre 
water use in the rest of resource situations is listed in Appendix D. 
Since the resource situations from 64 to 72 have the highest saturated 
thickness (350-400 feet), the quota policy does not affect the rates 
of annual per acre water use. However, the quota policy restricts the 
rates in the resource situations with low saturated thickness (less 
than 100 feet) as shown in Appendix D. Because of the quota policy, 
the rates of water use are limited in some resource situations. This 
makes the rates of water use in the rest of resource situations higher 
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Table 5.9. Annual per acre water use under social optimal, quota, and 
free market policies 
m r Resource Situation 
lype or 55 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 
policy ,4^-. 
Social 1985 
a 
optimal 1.460 1.415 1.370 1.325 1.280 1.235 1.190 -
Quota 1.573 1.528 1.483 1.438 1.392 1.347 1.302 - -
Free 
market 1.573 1.528 1.483 1.438 1.392 1.347 1.302 - -
Social 2005 
a 
optimal 1.944 1.899 1.857 1.809 1.763 1.718 1.673 - -
Quota 2.069 2.024 1.978 1.933 1.888 1.843 1.798 - -
Free 
market 2.065 2.020 1.974 1.929 1.884 1.839 1.794 -
^Por simplicity, levels of annual per acre water use are listed 
for the initial year (1985) and the terminal year (2005). 
than the rates in both the social optimal and free market policies. 
While more lands are irrigated, less groundwater is pumped under 
the quota policy and hence total decline of the water table is the 
smallest (Table 5.10). However, total net farm income is smaller 
than that under the flexible taxation policy or the fixed taxation 
policy. It is smaller than that under the social optimal policy by 
27.7 million dollars. Also, a fixed quota policy over time rather 
than every five years may be possible to implement. However, it was not 
Table 5.10. Several important values under social optimal, quota, and free market policies 
Type of 
policy 
Total water 
use 
(million 
acre-feet) 
Total 
irrigated 
acreage 
(million 
acres) 
Total net 
farm income 
(million 
dollars) 
Total net present 
value of 
farm income 
(million 
dollars) 
Total 
decline 
of 
water table 
(feet) 
Social 
optimal 
Quota 
Free 
market 
30.42 
29.82 
31.61 
20.50 
20.77 
19.81 
17,934,7 
17,907.0 
17,864.4 
9,828.4 
9,805.7 
9,794.4 
65.20 
63.73 
68.09 
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included in our experiments since it will, clearly, show more decline 
of total net farm income. 
Administrative and management costs to implement the quota policy 
will be similar to those for the flexible taxation policy since both 
are recalculated for every five years and the amounts of water used 
by every irrigator must be checked. Nevertheless, the flexible 
taxation policy shows a higher total net farm income than the quota 
policy even if it saves a little more of the water stock. Therefore, 
we can conclude that the flexible taxation policy is superior to the 
quota policy.^ 
Some estimates of policy costs are needed for conclusions. But 
looking at the benefits side, only the experimental results for the 
Ogallala aquifer prove that the flexible taxation is, generally-, 
the best policy while there are exceptions such as the time for 
emergency crisis. Also, experimental results show that the flexible 
taxation policy with five year intervals is superior to the exact 
taxation policy and the fixed taxation policy even though it depends 
upon the administrative and management costs difference. The flexible 
taxation policy with five year intervals reduces administrative costs 
and, at the same time, keeps benefits close to that of the social 
optimal solution. 
^The point that the taxation policy is superior to the quota policy 
in a dynamic setting, is shown empirically by Noel et al. (44) in 
California. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY, FINDINGS, AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS 
Water shortage is one of the most serious long-range problems.for 
the United States, as has been evidently realized in recent years. 
Agricultural consumption of water comprises about 80 percent of the 
total amount of water consumed in the U.S., of this 80 percent, a 
large portion is groundwater. With rising energy costs and declining 
water tables, it appears that the U.S. agricultural sector faces the 
problem of how to efficiently allocate limited groundwater resources 
intertemporally and spacially. 
Summary 
The major objectives of this study are: (1) to derive the social 
optimal solution for groundwater mining and to compare it to, the free 
market solution in order to estimate economic losses and excessive 
depletion due to commonality, and (2) to examine water policies, 
including taxation and quota policies, toward the social optimal 
(intertemporal and spacial) allocation of groundwater. 
The objectives are accomplished by developing a discrete-time, 
finite-horizon groundwater mining model in the Ogallala Aquifer- The 
model is solved by optimal control theory for the years 1985-2005 
inclusive. Five alternative situations, with respect to energy and 
crop prices and discount rates, are analyzed. They are; the normal 
energy and crop prices (alternative A), the high energy prices 
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(alternative B), the low energy prices (alternative C), the low 
crop prices (alternative D), and the high discount rate (alternative 
E). The region is divided into 144 portions according to the resource 
situations, and the groundwater mining problems in each resource 
situation are then solved simultaneously. 
The model developed in this study provides the policy maker 
with a method to estimate the user cost of groundwater mining. As long 
as the policy maker has enough information on the net return function 
and on the level of the water table, he can easily calculate the 
user cost every year, or every five years using the updated informa­
tion. Then, in regions where the pricing policy by a central agency 
is possible (since in some regions it is difficult to implement the 
pricing policy because of water laws such as the "appropriation 
doctrine"), the optimal policy can be realized by the imposition of 
extraction or use taxes which are equal to the level of the user cost. 
The groundwater conservation districts may control the water use 
up to the optimal level by levying taxes or other kinds of regulations, 
which are appropriate to the situation of the region. 
In experiments, (1) the flexible taxation which changes every five 
years, (2) the fixed taxation which is constant over periods of 21 
years, and (3) the quota policy are employed. Then they are compared 
to the social optimal and the free market policies. 
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Findings 
Key experimental results are enumerated below; 
1. The better the resource situation the higher the optimal 
rate of water use. 
2 .  The higher the discount rate the greater the optimal rate 
of water use. 
3. The higher the energy price the higher the optimal rate of 
water use and the total water use and the smaller the total farm 
income. 
4. The higher the crop price the greater the total water 
use cind the larger the total farm income. 
5. Effects of the commonality are reflected in both net farm 
incomes and groundwater stock. With the free market policy the region 
will lose 70 million dollars in net farm income and 2.9 feet of its 
water table under the base alternative. However, amounts of loss 
depend upon the levels of energy and crop prices and the discount 
rate. 
6. The flexible taxation is the best policy maintaining benefits 
close to that of the social optimal policy probably with a relatively 
low administrative and management cost to implement the policy. It, 
however, depends on the level of costs incurred in managing and 
enforcing the policy. Therefore, the free market policy could some­
times be superior. 
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Future Research Needs 
Uncertainty and instability are the basic qualitative characteristics 
of agricultural and food commodity systems. These characteristics of 
the agricultural sector require that the model be stochastic and dynamic 
(Rausser and Hochman (49, p. 11)). The model of this study is a dynamic 
model and it captures time lags associated with economic activities 
and physical characteristics. However, it is a deterministic model rather 
than a stochastic model, and does not take explicit account of risk and un 
certainty. Meteorological conditions may have stochastic influences 
on the model results. Uncertainty prevails in energy and crop prices 
and in responses of farmers to governmental policies. Only uncertain­
ty on energy and crop prices is taken into account with the\heavy -dose 
of sensitivity analysis in this study. And the rest of the stoohgstic 
influences are out of the scope of the model. 
Groundwater resources data are very poor as researchers who have 
worked on groundwater projects know. The data limit the model to a 
deterministic one. Groundwater inflow and outflow data are rough. 
Also, no groundwater stocks are estimated uniformly by each state 
and county. Data problems force us to employ the combination of a linear 
programming parametric technique and a regression analysis in estimating 
a set of net return functions for irrigation and dryland farming, instead 
of estimating them directly. 
With better and more reliable data, a dynamic groundwater mining 
model with a stochastic nature would be desirable to meet policy makers' 
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demand for a more flexible and, at the same time, more accurate analysis 
for optimal groundwater minings. 
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APPENDIX A: CONCEPTS OF CONTROL THEORY 
The formulation of an optimal control problem consists of (1) a 
system equation, (2) constraints, and (3) a performance measure. The 
system equation is also called equations of motion and presents the 
physical relations among variables involved in the system considered. 
It is expressed by sets of differential or difference equations. 
Constraints present restrictions on the variables. The constraint 
which restricts the initial condition is called the initial constraint. 
Similarly, the constraint which restricts the terminal condition is the 
terminal constraint. The performance measure is the value which is to 
be maximized or minimized and formulized in a way dependent on the 
problems investigated. 
Variables are divided into two kinds: state variables and control 
variables. State variables are variables which characterize the 
state of the system and can not be controlled by the decision-maker 
(or the policymaker) and control variables are variables which are 
chosen by the decision-maker and govern rates of changes of state 
variables. 
The general control problem is that of choosing time paths for 
control variables from many possible sets of time paths so as to 
maximize or minimize the performance measure subject to the system 
equation and constraints. According to Dorfman (18, p. 817), control 
theory is formally identical with capital theory which is the economics of 
time. Also, in economic terms "the problem is that of allocating scarce 
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resources among competing ends over an interval of time from initial 
time to terminal time", (Intriligator (32, p. 292)). The problem is 
formulated mathematically as follows : 
t_ 
Max J = L(X(t), u(t), t)dt + h(X(t_), t.) 
t — — — t r 
o 
(G) \ Subject to: X = jE(X^(t) , u(t) , t) 
and X(t ) = X. 
— o — 
Where L and h are specified (L is called the intermediate function and 
h is called the final function) functions, t^ and t^ are fixed, and 
X(t) and u(t) are vectors of control variables and state variables, 
respectively. X is a vector of the time rate of change of the state 
variables and £ is an n-vector-valued function. 
There are three approaches to control theory: the calculus of 
variations, dynamic programming, and the maximum principle. I am 
going to introduce instances briefly one by one.^ 
Calculus of Variations 
The calculus of variation problem is the special case of the 
general control problem. It is as: 
^This part is based mainly upon Intriligator (32) and Kirk 
(38) . 
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Max J = 
X(t) 
F(X(t) , X(t) , t)dt 
o 
(C) Subject to: X(t ) = X 
o -o 
and Xltf' = it 
f 
where F is a specified continuously differentiable function and X and 
X^ are given vectors. The problem is that of choosing time paths for a 
f 
vector of state variables given initial and terminal state variables so 
as to maximize the value of the integral of the function F. The control 
variables are the time rate of change of the state variables. 
Let the variation about the solution trajectory {x(t)} be {z(t)}, 
for example, shown in Figure A.l. Z(t) can be expressed as: 
where n(t) is any continuous function with piecewise continuous derivative 
ri(t^) = n(t^) = 0 
and eis the difference between {x(t)} and {z(t)}. The value of the 
-o 
z(t) = x(t) + en(t) 
for which 
performance measure for the variation about {Z(t)} can be considered 
a function of E: 
t 
o 
j(e) must be maximized at E=0 since {x(t)} is a solution, i.e.. 
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Figure A.l. Solution, X(t), and variation about the solution, Z(t) 
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|2:(o) = 0 
for all (t) 
However 
dJ 
de 
rt 
(o) = f (|S + n)dt 
9X 
= 1 ^ A)dt 
t 3X 
o 
(||n)at 4. 
o 
d d ,3F, ^ F • 
Since —(-^) = ^(—)T1 + — n dt 
3X ax X 
at .  
t 9x o 
o 
o 
since n (t^) = r) (t^) = 0. 
Therefore; 
dJ, 
de 
(o) 
4 
[|^  - §r(^)]ndt= 0 for all n(t) 
t 9x 
o 
This implies: 
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This equation is called the Euler equation and is most substantial 
necessary condition for the calculus of variation problem. It is 
analogous to the first-order condition that the derivative vanish in 
the static case. Some of the other necessary conditions are the 
Legendre condition, the Weierstrass condition and the Weierstrass-Erdman 
corner conditions. The Legendre condition (or the Clebsch condition) 
is analogous to the second-order condition in the static case. It is 
expressed as follows: 
9^F 
—— is negative definite or negative semidefinite (for an 
M 
interior maximum) 
The Weierstrass condition is analogous to the one that the objective 
function be concave in the static case. It is expressed via the 
Weierstrass excess function defined as 
E(X, X, X• , t) = F(X, X', t) - F(X, X, t) 
3F • « 
- —(X, X, t) • (X' - X) . 
9X 
The condition is: 
E(X, X, X', t) < 0 
This condition is always met if the function F (X^, X, t) is a concave 
function with respect to X as shown in Figure A.2.(which indicates 
the case with a single state variable). The last of the necessary 
conditions are the Weierstrass-Erdmann comer conditions. Since they 
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F 
- . . (X'-x) 
F(X')-F(X) J dX 
F(X). 
X' 
Figure A . 2 .  Concave function F(X,X,t) 
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depend on time they have no direct analogoue in the static case. It is 
presented as : 
— and F - — • X are continuous across corners. 
9X 
This condition implies that 
if -
for the case with a single state variable. The calculus of variations 
can be used to solve certain control problems with constraints (the 
integral constraint, equality constraints, and inequality constraints). 
However, the calculus of variations can not solve problems in which 
the control variables are restricted to a given control set. This is 
the crucial weakness which can be overcome by the modern version of 
the calculus of variations, i.e., dynamic programming and the maximum 
principle. 
Dynamic Programming 
Dynamic programming is a more general approach than the classical 
calculus of variations. The dynamic programming problem is formulated 
as follows ; 
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(D) subject to: ^ = ^(X, u, t) 
Max J = 
u(t) Jt^ 
L(X, u, t)dt + h (X (tgl , t^) 
X(t^) = Xf 
{u(t)} e u 
The necessary condition of dynamic programming is based upon the following 
statement called "the principle of optimality" by Bellman; 
An optimal policy has the property that whatever the 
initial state and initial decision are, the remaining decisions 
must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state 
resulting from the first decision. 
This principle is illustrated in Figure A.3 for the case with a single 
state variable. Let's assume that X*(t) for t < t < t^ is the 
o ~ — r 
optimal trajectory associated with the optimal control. Among many 
trajectory for t^ ^  t ^  t^, the trajectory B is an optimal trajectory 
with the initial condition X(T). It is independent of how the system 
arrived at the X(T) from the original condition X(t^). 
Let J*(X, t) be the optimal performance function for the control 
problem starting at the initial state X^ at time t. Then the optimal 
performance function for the problem (D) is J* = J*(X^, t^). Over 
the interval of time between t and t+At, the increment to the optimal 
performance function is approximately L(X, u, t) • At. Therefore, 
using the principle of optimality, J* (X^, t) can be presented as; 
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X 
x*(t) 
o t t t 
Figure A.3. The principle of optimality for the case with a single 
State variable 
126 
J*(X, t) = Max [L(X, u, t)At + J*(X + AX, t+At)]. 
u(t) 
This is called the fundamental recurrence relation. Assuming J*(3(, t) 
is a single-valued and continuously differentiable function, 
J*(X + Ax, t+At) can be decomposed as; 
J*(X + Ax, t + At) = J*(X, t) + 1^ • Ax + 1^ At + 
using a Taylor's series expansion. Plugging J* (}{ + àX, t + At) into 
AX 
J*(X, t) and arranging the equation by using lim 7— = X = f(X, u, t) 
At+o At 
yields : 
9J* 9J* 
- = Max [L(X, u, t) + T— • f (x, u, t) ] . 
u(t) 
This is the necessary condition of dynamic programming and called 
"Bellman's equation". We define Hamiltonian as: 
H(X, t) = L(X, u, t) + • f (X, u*, t) 
where u* is the optimal solution. Then, the resulting partial dif­
ferential equation: 
t) + = 0 
is called the "Hamiltonian-Jacobi equation". Dynamic programming is more 
general than the classical calculus of variations, so the necessary condi­
tion of dynamic programming (Bellman's equation) includes the necessary 
conditions of the calculus of variations (the Euler equation, the Legendre 
condition, the Weierstrass condition, and the Weierstrass-Erdmann corner 
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conditions). 
Maximum Principle 
The maximum principle is most powerful approach among three 
approaches to the control problem. The maximum principle problem is 
formulated as follows: 
rt. 
Max J = 
u(t) 
(M) / subject to: 
L(X, u, t)dt + h(X(t^) , tg) 
X = f(X, u, t) 
X(t ). = X 
— o ~o 
X(tg) = X^, and 
{u(t).} E U 
(A.l) 
(A.2) 
(A.3) 
(A.4) 
To derive the necessary conditions of the maximum principle, let's 
ignore the constraints (A.3) and (A.4) for a while. X is the n x 1 
state vector and u is the m x 1 control vector as noted before. We 
can write 
ft. 
h(x(t ),t ) - h(X(t ),t ) = 
— f r — o o 
^ h(x(t) ,t)dt. 
Then the performance measure is ; 
t„ 
J = {L(X, u, t) + h(X(t), t)}dt + h( X(t_),t ). 
— — cit — — o o 
The final term h(X(t ),t ) is independent of u(t) since X(t ) and t 
— oo — — o c 
are fixed. We can omit this term for maximization of J. Now the 
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performance measure can be written as: 
t„ 
J = { L(X , u, t) + [||(x(t) ,t)]'^x(t) + ||(x(t),t)}dt 
by using the chain rule of differentiation. The augmented functional 
by adjoining the constraining relations to J, can be formed as: 
t_ 
J = 
a 
{L(X(t), u(t) + [||(X(t), t)]'^X(t) 
+ |J-(X(t), t) + A^\t)[f(X(t), u(t), t) - X(t)]}dt 
where A(t) is the n x 1 Lagrange multiplier vector. Let us define 
L^(X(t), X (t) , u(t), (t) , t) = L(X(t), u(t) , t) 
+ [||(Mt), t)]^-X(t) +||(x{t), t) 
+  X  (t)tf(X(t), u, (t), t) - X(t)]. 
Let 6J , ÔX, ÔX, 6u, 6X, and t_ be the variation of J , X, X, u, X ,  
t.. Then 6j on an extremal is: 
r a 
9L T 
ÔJ (u*) = 0 = [—(X*(t^), a*(t_), u*(t_), A*(t_), t.)] 6Xf 
a  —  S x "  
3. 
+ [L (...) - (— (...))"X*(t )]Ôt 
^ 9X t r 
BL T d 3L T 
[ " ' ) ) "dt^y^ (•••)) ]5x(t) 
^o — 
3L 
T T 
+ [^(...)] 6u(t) + [—(...)] 6X(t)}dt. 
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Arranging terms inside the integral yields: 
 ^ SIj T T 
{ [|^(X* (t), u* (t), t) ) + X*^ (t) [^(X* (t), u* (t) , t) ] 
o 
T St. T T 
- ^ [-A* (t)]]ôX(T) + ((|^(...))^+x* (t) (g^(...))]6u(t) 
+ [(f{...) - X*(t))^]6X(t)}dt. 
This integral must vanish on an external regardless of the boundary 
conditions. From the first term inside the integral, 
T 9L 
X*(t) = -[^(X((t), u*(t), t)] A*(t) - ^ (X* (t) , u*(t), t). (A. 5) 
Similarly, from the second term, 
|^(X*(t), u*(t), t) + I^(X*(t), u*(t), t)]'^X*(t) = 0. (A.6) 
Finally, from the third term, 
X*(t) = f(X*(T), u*(T), t) . (A.7) 
Also, the terms outside the integral must be zero: 
[||(X*(tf), t^) - X*(t^)]^6X^ + [L(X*(t^), u* (tg), t^). 
+ (tg), tg) + A* (tf) • X*(t^)]<St^ = 0. (A.8) 
By defining the Hamiltonian function as 
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H(X(t), u(t), A(t), t) = L(X(t), u(t), t) 
+ (t) [£(X (t) , u{t) , t) ] , 
the necessary conditions (A.5) through (A.8) can be rewritten as 
follows : 
- ^ (X*(t), u*(t), A*(t), t) = X*(t) (A.9) 
U(X*(t), u*(t), X*(t) , t) = 0 (A.10) 
— (X*(t), u(t), X*(t), t) = X* (A.11) 
and 
+ [H(X*(t^), u*(t^), ^ *(t^), tg) 
+ ||(X*{t^), tg)]5t2 = 0. (A.12) 
According to the boundary conditions, Equation'(A.12) changes. Fpr 
example, if we add the constraint (A.3), then (A.12) will be replaced 
by: 
X*(t_) = X. (A.13) 
— r —f 
with fixed final time since 6x^ = 0^ and ôt^ = 0, and replaced by: 
H(X*(tg), u*(t^), X*(t^), tg) +||(x*(t^), t^) = 0 (A. 14) 
with free final time since 6x^ = 0 (but 6t^ is arbitrary). 
131 
The maximum principle is broken into two parts: one is to solve 
for the optimal controls as functions of the co-state variables expressed 
by Equation (A.10), other is to solve for the co-state variables over an 
interval of time from initial time to terminal time expressed by 
Equation (A.9). Particularly, Equation (A.10) suggests the nature of 
the solution which is very important for economic analyses. In addition, 
dynamic programming yields a nonlinear partial differential equation 
to compute optimal controls, while the maximum principle yields sets of 
ordinary differential equations. Therefore, the maximum principle is 
used more frequently in many fields such as mathematics, engineering, 
biology, and economics. 
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APPENDIX B; ESTIMATION OF NET RETURN FUNCTIONS 
FROM IRRIGATION AND DRYLAND FARMING 
Methodology and Model 
Methodology 
The methodology proposed in this study is a mixture of a linear 
programming and a regression analysis resulting in a set of net return 
functions for irrigation and dryland farming. Two basic steps are 
involved; (1) solve a linear programming model employing parametric 
techniques and (2) estimate regression equations using the data derived 
from the first step. 
How is the net return defined in this study? In the theory of 
the firm, the decision-making of the firm is done so as to maximize its 
profit;^ a profit-maximizing firm equates its marginal revenue with its 
marginal costs. A variant of a maximization model has been proposed 
2 
by William J. Baumol. It is a revenue-maximization model which assumes 
that firms do not attempt to maximize profit, but rather maximize total 
revenue^ subject to the constraint that the minimum profit level is 
maintained. However, in this study, the normal profit maximization 
model, which is equivalent to a cost minimization problem, is-assumed as 
^TT = TR - TC where IT is the profit, TR is the total revenue, and 
TC is the total cost. 
2 
Cohen and Cyert (13, pp. 221-222), and Henderson and Quandt (27, 
pp. 446-450). 
^TR = P*Q where TR is the total revenue, P is the output price, 
and Q is the quantity of output sold. 
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the nearest concept to the real agricultural world. 
Net returns for irrigation farming and dryland fanning under dif­
ferent crop price levels, energy price levels, water situations, and 
land classes are estimated in this study. 
All information is combined and summarized in two net return func­
tions, one each for irrigation and dryland farming. Comparing these two 
functions, it is possible to show whether a farmer should continue 
irrigation or switch to dryland under assumptions implicit in the 
model. With a fixed level of crop prices, water situations, and land 
class, net returns can be expressed as a function of the energy price 
level as depicted in Figure B.l. Net returns per acre are shown on the 
vertical axis and energy prices on the horizontal axis. The intersec­
tion of two functions can be found by solving the two net return 
functions. At energy prices lower than in Figure B.l irrigation 
gives farmers a higher net return and at energy prices higher than 
dryland farming delivers the better net return. , 
The model ignores risk and the capital structure of the individual 
farms so that actual switching points may be different than those 
selected by the model. The switch point (at the point b in Figure 
B.2), for instance, will be determined at higher energy price level for 
an established farmer who has the irrigation facility, compared to the 
switch point for a beginning farmer (at the point a in Figure B.2). The 
net returns for the decision to irrigate or not of the farmer include 
the returns to irrigation investment and are therefore, lower than that 
of the latter. The beginning farmer may also have a higher discount rate 
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L_ 
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•M 
O) 
z 
on net return 
0 Energy Price 
Figure B.l. Net returns per acre as a function of energy prices for 
a fixed level of crop prices 
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Return to Irrigation 
investment 
Return to 
management 
and land 
Energy Price 
Switch polnt^ 
for a beginning 
farmer 
Switch point for 
an established 
fanner without 
consideration 
of risk 
Dryland 
net return 
Dryland net 
return with 
risk considered 
Irrigation net 
return including 
return to Irrigation 
Investment 
Irrigation net 
return 
Switch point for 
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farmer with 
consideration 
of risk 
Figure B.2. Net returns per acre as a function of energy prices for a 
fixed level of crop prices with risk both for an established 
farmer and a beginning farmer 
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because of capital constraints. Also, the irrigation farmer is less 
familiar with the dryland farming which has larger fluctuation of the 
yield due to weather changes. Thus, the risk coming from dryland 
farming is larger than irrigation farming and it makes the dryland 
net return expressed in utility terms relative to the dryland net 
return function shift down. Therefore, the switch point for both will 
shift to the higher energy price level (at the point c) compared 
to the situation the risk is not considered. In this study, however, 
the difference between the established and the beginning farmer and the 
risk for dryland farming is not considered. Therefore, only the 
direction of the switch point changes under these situations. 
Thus, the results of the study provide a basis for farmers to 
determine at what level of energy price or crop price the switches from 
the irrigation to the dryland are profitable for them. 
The demand curve for crops facing the region is infinitely (or 
perfectly) elastic since a competitive market is assumed, i.e., production 
in the region is small relative to production in the nation as a whole 
so changes in production practices do not affect crop prices. Crop 
prices are determined by the interaction of supply and demand nationally. 
Changes in crop prices are a result of shifts in demand caused by such 
impacts as fluctuation in exports or demands for goods to produce 
gasohol causing regions to respond. In Figure B.3, supply . . 
curve shifts to due to the rise of energy price reducing the 
equilibrium quantity from q^ to q^ (equilibrium point B). However, the 
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q q Quantity of Crop 
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Figure B.3. Regional demand and supply for crop 
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reduced supply in the market makes the price of the crop increase 
and the demand curve shifts up gradually from and stops at 
where market demand and supply meet. The equilibrium will be 
determined at the point C, having the price and the quantity q^. 
The line combining the original point A and the final point C implies 
the industry demand for the crop (ID). The effect of an energy price in­
crease indicates the movement from the point A to the point B in 
Figure B.3. But the full effect of the rise of energy prices would also 
include increased crop prices and therefore, increased production and 
income in the study area. The effect of changes in energy prices how­
ever shift the supply function of agriculture in the nation as a whole 
and perhaps the demand function for agriculture corresponds as well. 
A total of 280 solutions, with 56 solutions for four distinct 
water situations for irrigation and 56 for dryland farming, is obtained,. 
Each set of 56 solutions is comprised of four different crop price levels, 
seven energy price levels, and two land classes. Figure B.4 depicts 
schematically the network of 28 solutions obtained for each of the four 
irrigation situations and both land classes. 
Energy price levels I, II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII indicate the 
50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, and 350 percent of the base prices,^ 
respectively. Crop price levels A, B, C, and D denotes the 75, 100, 
^Doubling of 1975-79 average prices of four fuels including diesel, 
liquid petroleum gas, natural gas, and electricity. 
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D3(P3) 
^2 ^^ 2^ 
Quantity of Crops 
= crop price, i=l,2,3,4 
Pgj = energy price, j=l,2,3,4,5,6,7 
= demand for crop, i=l,2,3,4 
Sj = supply of crop, j=l,2,3,4,5,6,7 
Figure B.4. Regional demand and supply in the model 
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150, and 200 percent of the base price, respectively. 
Linear programming model 
The linear programming model selects the levels of production, 
resource use, and land price by maximizing net returns from the production 
of 10 endogenous crops (barley, corn, silage, legume hay, nonlegume 
hay, oats, sorghum, wheat, soybeans, and cotton) subject to maximum 
constraints on land. 
Objective functions The objective function maximizes net returns 
from crop sales. It can be expressed mathematically as: 
Max Z P.G, _ Z T L _ PV _ E 
1 ]kln m 
i = 1,...,10 for the crop produced, 
j = 1,...,3 for the tillage practice, 
k = 1,...,48 for the crop rotations, 
1 = 1,2 for the land class, 
m = 1,...,4 for the type of fuel used, 
n = 1,...,4 for the water situation for the Ogallala 
aquifer, 
where 
P is the price of crop sold, 
Q is the quantity of crop sold, 
T is the rotation cost, 
^1974-78 average prices of 10 crops including barley, corn, silage, 
legume hay, nonlegume hay, oats, sorghum, wheat, soybeans, and cotton. 
141 
L is the level of crop activity, 
N 
P is the price of nitrogen 
is the quantity of nitrogen purchased, 
P is the price of fuel, 
is the quantity of fuel purchases. 
Four distinct objective functions are defined corresponding to the four 
levels of crop prices. The objective functions A, B, C, and D are re­
ferred to 75, 100, 150, and 200 percent of base prices, respectively. 
The base price level shown in Table B.l is calculated based on a five 
year average of market prices (1974-78). The set of four price levels 
represent the range of prices that can be expected in the future. 
Activities The model contains rotations, crop selling, nitrogen 
buying, and energy buying activities. 
Each rotation represents a combination of one tô four of the 10. 
endogenous crops. The coefficients calculated for com rotation are (1) 
costs, which include pesticides, labor, machinery, ownership costs for 
capital goods, and costs of other miscellaneous inputs, (2) yields, 
(3) water associated with each yield, (4) land which is always one, 
and (5) energy costs. 
In addition, selling activities for 10 endogenous crops, nitrogen 
buying activities, and energy buying activities are contained in the 
model. 
Table B.l. Average base crop price levels, 1975-79' 
Crops Unit Price (dollars) 
Corn 
Barley 
Silage 
Legume hay 
Nonlegume hay 
Oats 
Sorghum 
Wheat 
Soybeans 
Cotton 
bushel 
bushel 
ton 
ton 
ton 
bushel 
bushel 
bushel 
CWT 
bales 
2.57 
1.96 
10.00 
66.00 
47.70 
1.44 
2.27 
3.09 
12.07 
235.30 
^U.S. Department of Agriculture (70). 
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Water situations The area using water from the Ogallala Aquifer 
is broken into four water situations defined according to a depth to 
water. Each situation has distinct irrigation costs since the energy 
needed for pumping water is different. Table B.2 shows the four 
classifications of water situations in the Ogallala. 
Land base The cropland base is built from the Conservation Needs 
Inventory which reports acres of land by agricultural capability class. 
It classifies the land into eight major classes with four subclasses re­
flecting susceptibility to erosion (e), subsoil exposure (s), drainage 
problems (w), and climatic conditions preventing normal crop pro­
duction (c).^ The land classes one and two used in this study are shown in 
Table B.3. Land class one contains almost all land suited for culti­
vation. Land class two includes only the class Ille land whose soil has 
severe limitations due to erosion problems. Therefore, each crop produced 
2 in land class two has a lower yield than in land class one. Also, the 
energy coefficients used for land class two irrigation is larger as it 
is assumed a sprinkler because of steeper slopes. Land class one assumes 
a mix of gravity distribution systems and sprinklers. With an adjust­
ment the acreages in 1990 are projected for two land class and four 
water situations (Table B.4). 
^Meister and Nicol (41). 
2 
Each crop has the lower yield by the following percentages: 41, 
13, 12, 38, 6, 3, 41, 38, 11, and 41 for barley, corn, silage, cotton, 
legume hay, nonlegume hay, oats, sorghum, soybeans and wheat, 
respectively. 
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Table B.2. Water situations 
Depth to water (feet) 
0-50 50-100 100-200 200+ 
Water 
situation 12 3 4 
Table B.3. Land group and subgroup aggregated to the two land 
quality classes 
Land quality Inventory 
class class-subclass 
1 I, II, III, IV (except IVe), V 
2 Ille^ 
^e indicates that the susceptibility to erosion is the dominant 
problem or hazard in their use. 
Table B.4. Land base acreages in 1990 (Short et al., 51) 
Land 
class 
Water 
situation 
Depth 
to water 
(feet) 
Acres 
(thousand acres) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Nonirrigation 
0-50 
50-100 
100-200 
200+ 
N.A. 
130.8 
267.1 
620.1 
1,476.7 
709.5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Nonirrigation 
0-50 
50-100 
100-200 
200+ 
N.A. 
80.5 
131.1 
224.4 
294.3 
187.1 
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Parametrization In order to examine the effect of energy price 
changes, a parametric procedure is used to change the costs of energy 
in the objective functions. Four different types of fuel are used in 
the model: diesel, liquid petroleum gas (LP), natural gas, and 
electricity. On the farm energy required for irrigation, machine 
operation, crop drying, and energy required for the manufacture of 
nitrogen, other fertilizers, and pesticides they are quantified. Seven 
levels of fuel prices are defined; 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, and 350 
percents of the base prices. The base prices are 0.541 dollars per 
gallon for diesel, 0.543 dollars per gallon for LP, 5.950 dollars per 
MCF, for natural gas, and 0.0488 dollars per KWH for electricity. The 
natural gas is relatively high because of assumed effects of de­
regulation. 
Solutions A total of 28 solutions to the model is obtained 
for each water situation and dryland, and for each land class. The 28 solu­
tions show all possible combinations of the four different crop price 
levels and seven energy price levels. The solution covers the range 
of possible situations expected in the future. 
Regression analysis 
The data derived from the solution of the linear programming 
model and its parametrization are summarized by regression analysis. 
Net return functions for irrigation and drylcind farmings are estimated. 
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The conceptual model Equation (B.l) shows the general form of a 
net return function from irrigation farming using groundwater. 
NRI = f(D, U, CP, EP, XI) (B.l) 
where NRI is the amount of net return per acre from irrigation using 
groundwater for a given year; D, the depth to water; U, the amount of 
water applied per acre in a given year; CP, the crop price index; EP, 
the energy price index; XI, a dummy variable for land class one. 
Similarly, the general form of a net return function from dryland 
farming is: 
NRD = g(CP, EP, XI) (B.2) 
where NRD is the amount of net return from dryland farming for a given 
year; CP, the crop price index; EP, the energy price index; XI, the 
dummy variable for land class one. 
Determining a specific functional form from the general specifica­
tions of (B.l) and (B.2) is a matter of judgment. The quadratic form shown 
by Equation (B.3) and (B.4) is used throughout this study, since inter­
action terms seem to be significant. 
NRI = «Q + A^^D + A^U + A^CP + A^EP + AGD*D + A^U*U + A^CP*CP 
+ agEP*EP + OGD+U + a^OD*CP + a^^D*EP + a^2U*CP + Q^gUtEP 
+ A^^CP*EP + A^GXL + E^ (B.3) 
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and 
NRD = 3q + g^CP + GgEP + GgCpaCP + B^EP*EP + ggCP*EP + 3gXl + 
(B.4) 
where e^ and e^ are error terms assumed normally distributed. 
Based on the framework mentioned above, net return functions for 
irrigation using groundwater and dryland farming are defined and esti­
mated by least squares fitting of the quadratic equation. 
A basic quadratic form relationship is assumed and the stepwise 
regression procedures used to determine which independent variables 
should be included in the regression model. The stepwise procedure 
adds the variables one by one to the model if the F-statistics for one 
or more variables has a significant probability greater than the 
specified "significance level for entry" and deletes a variable if the 
F-statistic has a significant probability smaller than the specified 
"significance level for stay." This is a modification of the forward 
selection technique (see Barr et al. (2)). 
Results 
The results are described in two parts in which first the linear 
programming solutions and then the fitted regression equations are 
presented. The effects of changes in energy and crop prices on net 
returns are shown for each solution of the linear programming model and 
each regression equation. 
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Results of linear programming model 
Net returns per acre under water situation one (25 feet of depth 
to water) are shown in Tables B.5 and B.6 for land class one and two, 
respectively. Net returns are naturally more sensitive to changes in 
crop prices rather than energy prices. Net returns per acre for irri­
gation on land class one are more than two hundred dollars larger than 
that on land class two. Class one lands have higher economic value 
due to high yields and low energy costs compared with class two 
lands. 
Tables B.7 and B.8 show net returns under water situation two (75 
feet of depth to water). More solutions have nonpositive net returns, 
eight nonpositive solutions for land class one and 19 nonpositive solu­
tions for land class two. This is due to larger depth to water in water 
situation two, because the larger depth to water raises pumping cost. 
There is more than two hundred dollars difference in net returns per 
acre between land classes one and two .similar to the case for water 
situation one. 
The net returns from irrigation under water situation three (150 
feet of depth to water) are presented in Tables B.9 and B.IO. The 
greater depth to water leads to a lower net return per acre in comparison 
to the net returns in more favorable water situations under the same 
levels of crop and energy prices. At the same time, the boundary 
between nonpositive and positive net returns shifts so that irrigated 
production is profitable in a smaller number of crop energy price 
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Table B.5. Net return per acre from irrigation. water situation one. 
land class one 
Energy price 
level 
Crop price level 
A B C 
(dollars) 
D 
I 34.004 115.059 277.170 439.280 
II 17.282 98.338 260.448 422.558 
III 0.561 81.616 243.726 405.836 
IV - 64.894 227.004 389.115 
V - 48.172 210.283 372.393 
VI - 31.450 193.561 355.671 
VII 
- 14.729 176.839 338.949 
Table B.6. Net return per acre from irrigation. water situation one. 
land class two 
Energy price 
level 
Crop price level 
A B C 
(dollars) 
D 
I - 48.003 164.579 
II - 19.506 142.413 
III - 7.666 113.916 
IV - 6.635 88.514 
V - — — 66.903 
VI - — — 55.514 
VII 44.125 
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Table B.7. Net return 
land class 
per acre from irrigation 
one 
, water situation two. 
Energy price 
level 
Crop price level 
A B C 
(dollars) 
D 
I 12.297 93.352 255.462 417.572 
II - 73.712 235.822 397.932 
III - 54.528 216.182 378.292 
IV - 36.407 196.541 358.652 
V - 9.464 176.901 339,011 
VI - 157.261 319.371 
VII - 137.620 299.731 
Table B.8. Net return 
land class 
per 
two 
acre from irrigation. water situation two. 
Energy price 
level 
Crop price level 
A B C 
(dollars) 
D 
I - 30.524 138.903 
II , - 12.064 103.195 
III - 10.137 76.474 
IV - - 67.149 
V - - - 55.418 
VI - - 43.688 
VII _ 
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Table B.9. Net return per acre from irrigation, water situation three, 
land class one 
„ . Crop price level 
Energy price ^ 
iGvel (dollars) 
I - 62.295 224.406 386.516 
II - 38.276 200.386 362.496 
III - 14.256 176.366 338.476 
IV - - 152.346 314.457 
V - 128.327 290.437 
VI - - 94.999 266.417 
VII - - 80.984 207.885 
Table B.IO. Net return per acre from irrigation, water situation 
three, land class two 
Energy price 
level 
Crop price level 
B C 
(dollars) 
I - - 6.312 101.154 
II - - 4.866 67.720 
III - - - 59.877 
IV — — — 46.145 
V - - — 32.413 
VI — — — — 
VII - - -
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combinations. 
Tables B.ll and B.12 show the net returns from irrigation under 
water situation four (250 feet of depth to water). This is the worst 
water situation giving the lowest and fewest positive net returns. 
Net returns using land class one still are more than two hundred 
dollars greater than net returns for land class two. 
The farmer should make a decision to cease irrigating when the 
net returns with irrigation are lower than his net returns from his best 
alternative because of the high energy price or the low crop price. 
Consequently, the net returns per acre from dryland farming reported in 
Tables B.13 and B.14 are important in decision-making. 
For dryland farming, the water situation of the land is no longer 
relevant but the land class remains critical. Net returns for dryland 
farming are even more sensitive to changes in crop prices than energy 
prices. Net returns for dryland farming decline gradually as energy 
prices increase while net returns for irrigation farming fall drastically. 
This can be explained by the fact that dryland farming is generally less 
energy intensive, and does not need fuel for pumping water. 
Tables B.5, B.7, B.9, B.ll, and B.13 are summarized in Figure B.5. 
Assuming a risk neutral farmer without any such investments in irrigation 
rather than an established farmer who practices irrigation and no organi­
zational bias, a farmer will choose dryland cropping if net returns from 
irrigation are lower than nonirrigation under the same expected situations. 
The effects of departures from these assumptions on actual switch points 
are described in the previous section. 
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Table B.ll. Net return per acre from irrigation, water situation four, 
land class one 
Energy price Crop price level " 
level (dollars) 
I - 19.304 181.415 343.525 
II - 151.581 313.691 
III - - 121.747 283.857 
IV - - 89.951 254.020 
V - 70.352 200.291 
VI - 53.430 181.850 
VII - - 34.628 158.057 
Table B.12. Net return per acre from irrigation, water situation four, 
land class two 
Crop price level 
Energy price 
(dollars) 
I - - - 47.423 
II - 32.217 
III - - - 4.225 
— — — — 
VI — — — — 
VII - - - -
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Table B.13. Net return per acre from dryland farming, land class one 
Crop price level 
Energy price C D~ 
level (dollars) 
I 39.283 84.915 176.181 267.446 
II 37.537 81.399 172.664 263.929 
III 34.780 77.883 169.148 260.413 
IV 32.022 74.894 165.632 256.897 
V 29.265 72.137 162,115 253.381 
VI 26.507 69.379 158.599 249.864 
VII 23.749 66.622 155.083 246.348 
Table B.14. Net return per acre from dryland farming, land class two 
Energy price Crop price level 
iGvel (dollars) 
I - 20.842 76.140 134.059 
II - 18.085 72.624 130.543 
III - 15.327 69.910 127.026 
IV - 12.570 67.152 123.510 
V - 9.812 64.394 119.994 
VI - - 61.637 116.219 
VII - - 58.879 113.461 
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Figure B.5. Net return, energy price and crop price under land class one 
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At crop price level A, the vector of lowest crop prices, dryland 
farming has higher net returns for all water situations. A farmer facing 
these prices would choose to not irrigate whatever the level of energy 
prices. At the normal level of crop prices, level B, a farmer should 
select irrigation or dryland farming according to the energy price 
level. The land in water situation one and water situation two has a 
turning point, where the farmer decides to switch back to dryland farming, 
between the energy price level III and IV, I and II, respectively. 
At the 50 percent higher crop price level C, the land in water situation 
one has always higher net return in irrigation farming and the land in 
water situations two, three, and four has the turning point between the 
energy price level V and VI, III and IV, and I and II, respectively. 
Finally, at the highest crop price level D, the doubling of base price, 
the land in water situations one and two has a comparative advantage in 
irrigation farming. The turning point for the land in water situation 
three and four is located at the point between energy price level VI 
and VII, and III and IV, respectively. 
Figure B.6 illustrates the results for land class two given in 
Tables B.6, B.8, B.IO, B.12 and B.14. At the lowest crop price level A, 
there are no solutions. At normal crop price level B and higher level 
C, the irrigation is dominated by the dryland farming. Only at the 
highest crop price level D, the turning points exist at the energy price 
level between II and III for the land in water situation one, and between 
I and II for the land in water situation two. 
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As the crop price rises, the turning points shift toward the point 
in the higher energy price for both land class one and two. Obviously, 
this conclusion comes from the trade-off relationship between the crop 
price and the energy price. Suppose farmers know the net return under 
different crop and energy prices, they will choose irrigation farming 
before the turning point and will switch to the dryland fanning 
after the turning point as the energy price increases, if it is 
assumed that farmers behave rationally. 
Results of regression analysis 
The results of the second part in the study are discussed 
in this section. Information obtained from the linear programming model 
is used to estimate the net return functions for irrigation and dryland 
farming. Some adjustments on the data have been done to facilitate 
analysis. Crop price levels A, B, C, and D are translated into a crop 
price index denoted by .75, 1.00, 1.50, and 2.00, respectively. Next, 
energy price levels I-VII are rewritten as an energy price index with 
values 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, and 3.5, respectively. Finally, 
water situations one, two, three, and four are replaced by the mid­
points of the range of the depths to water in each water situation; 
25, 75, 150, and 250 feet, respectively. 
The basic statistical results are presented in Table B.15. The 
2 
equations estimated have coefficients of determination (R ) of 0.992 
and 0.968 for each equation with all variables significant at less 
than five percent level. Also, all signs of the coefficients are as 
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Table B.15. Estimated net return functions for irrigation and dryland 
farming^ 
Irrigation (NRI) Dry (NRD) 
Intercept -374.6118 -215.4881 
D -0.3667 (0.079)b 
CP 335.2078 (28.130) 241.2301 (39.067) 
EP -71.7595 (8.396) 
D*EP -0.0547 (0.018) 
D*U -0.0482 (0.036) 
U*CP 36.9942 (18.632) 
U*EP 13.6666 (2.804) 
U*U -26.6872 (4.413) 
CP*CP -28.2935 (6.793) -29.4853 (13.637) 
EP*EP 2.9962 (1.203) -1.7426 (0.532) 
XI 246.1152 (3.362) 97.6060 (4.527) 
2° 
R 0.992 0.968 
MSE^ 154.685 216.073 
^Variable definition: NRI = the net return per acre for irrigation 
farming, dollars; NRD = the net return per acre for dryland farming, 
dollars; D = the depth to water, feet; U = the amount of water applied 
per acre in a given year, feet; CP = the crop price index; EP = the 
energy price index; XI = the dummy variable for the land class one. 
^Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. 
c 2 
R is the coefficient of determination. 
'^MSE is the mean square error. 
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expected. 
The equations clearly show that the interaction and the squared 
terms are significant in both functions. This implies that the rela­
tionships between the dependent variable (net returns) and the inde­
pendent variables are not simple linear forms. 
As independent variables, the depth to water, the amount of water 
applied, the crop price index, the energy price index, and the dummy 
variable for land class are chosen because their.impact is great, 
while the quantities of nitrogen or fertilizers applied, the labor, 
and other variables can be included in the equation if they are sig­
nificant. 
Implications 
Based on the nature of two estimated net return functions, four 
implications for the decision-making can be drawn from the results. 
First, the price levels of crop and energy have greater effect on 
the net return than the depth to water and the amount of water utilized. 
However, the effect of the energy price change is relatively small for 
dryland farming. This means that the changes of crop and energy price 
are the most important factors for farmers to determine which farming, 
irrigation or the dryland, is more profitable. 
Second, the land class gives a large difference in the net return. 
Class one land has 246 dollars, on the average, higher net return from 
the irrigation than the land of class two. For dryland farming, 
the difference in net return is smaller showing an average of; 
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the average. 
Third, the level of the depth to water also gives the difference 
in the net returns. One foot shallower water table provides 49, 51, 
53, 55, 57, 59, and 61 cents higher net return per acre with the energy 
price index of 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, and 3.5, respectively. 
Finally, the land class two is more sensitive to the changes of 
the energy price and the crop price than the land class one. In 
particular, the net return elasticity with respect to the crop price, for 
the irrigation in the land class two, is extremely large. This can be 
explained by the fact that the land class two is a marginal land and 
has already exceeded the profitable region for the irrigation. 
Limitations 
An analysis of economic phenomena and behavior can be changed by 
the range of time. The results coming from the fixed time and results 
derived from intertemporal analysis would be different. Although the 
net return functions for irrigation and dryland farming are estimated 
in this study, the effect of current net returns on future net returns 
is not considered. This study is not a dynamic but static analysis. 
When the net return for irrigation becomes lower than the net 
return for dryland farming, only one alternative, namely the switch to 
dryland cropping, is given in this study. This alternative has a 
passive nature and accepts the decline of income. Active alternatives, 
which keep and sometimes increase income, should be considered for 
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fanners' welfare in the region. They are importing water, artificial 
recharge, and water conserving irrigation practices such as trickle 
distribution system, irrigation scheduling, crop varieties which require 
less water. More attention to these alternatives must be paid in 
order to improve farm income in the region. 
Risks are ignored. As mentioned in the Methodology section, the 
risk comes from the dryland farming makes the switch point from irriga­
tion to dryland cropping shift to the higher energy price levels. 
The difference between the established and the beginning farmer 
are not considered. This study ignored the return to irrigation invest­
ment and therefore, the switch points are determined at the lower energy 
price levels showing the switch points for beginning farmers. 
In the real world, the prices of four energy sources; diesel, 
liquid petroleum gas, natural gas, and electricity do not change 
proportionally, although the proportional price change of four energy 
sources is assumed in this study. If nonproportional price changes are 
considered, the study will give a more realistic result while the model will 
be more complicated. 
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APPENDIX C; SOLUTION FOR DISCRETE-TIME 
FINITE-HORIZON CONTROL PROBLEM 
PROBLEM: 
Max J(D^, Uj., CP^, EP^, A, XI, t) 
Ht 
N-1 3^ T 
= 2 r- A • NRI. (D, , U., CP., EP^, XI, t) 
t=0 (l+r)t - tH: -t t t 
subject to 
T 
D..1 - ^  = a„lA Ut - a,I for t=0,l,...,N-1, 
—t+1 —t 0 1— 
where 
1 2 144 T 
NRI^ = [NRI^ , NRI^ ,...,NRI^ ] 
- V + + bjCP^I + bjEP^l + b^EP^D^ 
+ bg di.g[D,l + b^CP^l^ + b,EP^O^ 
+ bg'diagfU^^,... 
+ bgCP^.CP^I + b^QEP^.EP^I + b^iXl-I 
Ht = 
£t • 
A = [A^,A^,...,A^^^]'^ 
I = [1, 1,...,1]^ 
y - ry ^ y ^ y 144 T 
At ~ ' ^t " •• t 
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SOLUTION: 
The scalar function (Hamiltonian) is defined asi 
H = «''-«Ht + - "i" 
(1+r) 
(1) Sufficient condition; 
H is a concave function of D , since H is linear in D. . 
—t —t 
(2) Necessary condition: 
"H: 
[b -diag[D 1,D CP + b^EP 
(1+r) ^ ^ t)t7 t 
+ 2bg'cliag[U^^,U^^,...,U^^^^]]-A 
+ «o'diagtAt+i^'At+l^ = 2 
^ ^  + b^CP^I 4. b,EP^-Il 
. ., 9H _ , , 
" 3D^ ^+1 " ^  
. A • [b^+b^EP^] = At+I - At 
(1+r) 
4+1 ° & - TTTTt • à • ["i+Vt' (1+r) 
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sLi 
Etti - 2t - - «I'l 
Note; T denotes the transporse of vector or matrix, diag denotes 
the diagonal matrix. 
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APPENDIX D; ANNUAL PER ACRE WATER USE 
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Table D.l. Annual par acre water use for five model alternatives with 
the social optimal model 
Resource 
situation 
Model Alternative 
A B 
(feet 
C 
per acre) 
D E 
1985 
1 1.460 1.702 1.340 0.791 1.520 
2 1.415 1.657 1.295 0.746 1.475 
3 1.370 1.612 1.249 0.0 1.430 
4 1.325 1.566 1.204 0.0 1.385 
5 1.280 1.521 1.159 0.0 1.340 
6 1.235 0.0 1.114 0.0 1.295 
7 1.190 0.0 1.069 0.0 1.249 
8 0.0 0.0 1.024 0.0 0.0 
9 0.0 0.0 0.979 0.0 0.0 
10 1.460 1.702 1.340 0.791 1.520 
11 1.415 1.657 1.295 0.746 1.475 
12 1.370 1.612 1.249 0.0 1.430 
13 1.325 1.566 1.204 0.0 1.385 
14 1.280 1.521 1.159 0.0 1.340 
15 1.235 0,0 1.114 0.0 1.295 
16 1.190 0.0 1.069 0.0 1.249 
17 0.0 0.0 1.024 0.0 0.0 
18 0.0 0.0 0.979 0.0 0.0 
19 1.460 1.702 1.340 0.791 1.520 
20 1.415 1.657 1.295 0.746 1.475 
21 1.370 1.612 1.249 0.0 1.430 
22 1.325 1.566 1.204 0.0 1.385 
23 1.280 1.521 1.159 0.0 1.340 
24 1.235 0.0 1.114 0.0 1.295 
25 1.190 0.0 1.069 0.0 1.249 
26 0.0 0.0 1.024 0.0 0.0 
27 0.0 0.0 0.979 0.0 0.0 
28 1.460 1.702 1.340 0.791 1.520 
29 1.415 1.657 1.295 0.746 1.475 
30 1.370 1.612 1.249 0.0 1.430 
31 1.325 1.566 1.204 0.0 1.385 
32 1.280 1.521 1.159 0.0 1.340 
33 1.235 0.0 1.114 0.0 1.295 
34 1.190 0.0 1.069 0.0 1.249 
35 0.0 0.0 1.024 0.0 0.0 
36 0.0 0.0 0.979 0.0 0.0 
37 1.460 1.702 1.340 0.791 1.520 
38 1.415 1.657 1.295 0.746 1.475 
39 1.370 1.612 1.249 0.0 1.430 
40 1.325 1.566 1.204 0.0 1.385 
sH 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
.65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
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(Continued) 
Model Alternative 
A B C D E 
(feet per acre) 
1.280 1.521 1.159 0.0 1.340 
1.235 0.0 1.114 0.0 1.295 
1.190 0.0 1.069 0.0 1.249 
0.0 0.0 1.024 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.979 0.0 0.0 . 
1.460 1.702 1.340 0.791 1.520 
1.415 1.657 1.295 0.746 1.475 
1.370 1.612 1.249 0.0 1.430 
1.325 1.566 1.204 0.0 1.385 
1.280 1.521 1.159 0.0 1.340 
1.235 0.0 1.114 0.0 1.295 
1.190 0.0 1.069 0.0 1.249 
0.0 0.0 1.024 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.979 0.0 0.0 
1.460 1.702 1.340 0.791 1.520 
1.415 1.657 1.295 0.746 1.475 
1.370 1.612 1.249 0.0 1.430 
1.325 1.566 1.204 0.0 1.385 
1.280 1.521 1.159 0.0 1.340 
1.235 0.0 1.114 0.0 1.295 
1.190 0.0 1.069 0.0 1.249 
0.0 0.0 1.024 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.979 0.0 0.0 
1.460 1.702 1.340 0.791 1.520 
1.415 1.657 1.295 0.746 1.475 
1.370 1.612 1.249 0.0 1.430 
1.325 1.566 1.204 0.0 1.385 
1.280 1.521 1.159 0.0 1.340 
1.235 0.0 1.114 0.0 1.295 
1.190 0.0 1.069 0.0 1.249 
0.0 0.0 1.024 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.979 0.0 0.0 
1.460 0.0 1.340 0.0 1.520 
0.0 0.0 1.295 0.0 0,0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.460 0.0 1.340 0.0 1,520 
0.0 0.0 1.295 0.0 0.0 
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Table D.l (Continued) 
Resource 
situation 
Model Alternative 
A B C 
(feet per acre) 
D E 
127 1.460 0.0 1.340 0.0 1.520 
128 0.0 0.0 1.295 0.0 0.0 
129 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
130 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
131 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
132 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
133 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
134 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
135 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
136 1.460 0.0 1.340 0.0 1.520 
137 0.0 0.0 1.295 0.0 0.0 
138 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
139 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
140 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
141 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
142 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
143 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
144 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1990 
0.0 0.0 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.850 0.0 
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.805 0.0 
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10 1.559 1.898 1.406 0.850 1.619 
11 1.514 1.853 1.361 0.805 1.574 
12 1.469 1.808 1.316 0.0 1.529 
13 1.424 1.763 1,270 0.0 1.484 
14 1.379 1.718 1.225 0.0 1.439 
15 1.334 0.0 1.180 0.0 1.394 
16 1.288 0.0 1.135 0.0 1.348 
17 0.0 0.0 1.090 0.0 0.0 
18 0.0 0.0 1.045 0.0 0.0 
19 1.559 1.898 1.406 0.850 1.619 
20 1.514 1.853 1.361 0.805 1.574 
21 1.469 1.808 1.316 0.0 1.529 
22 1.424 1.763 1.270 0.0 1.484 
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Table D.l (Continued) 
Model Alternative 
rwisuuxue 
situation A B C (feet per acre) 
D D 
23 1.379 1.718 1.225 0.0 1.439 
24 1.334 0.0 1.180 0.0 1.394 
25 1.288 0.0 1.135 0.0 1.348 
26 0.0 0.0 1.090 0.0 0.0 
27 0.0 0.0 1.045 0.0 0.0 
28 1.559 1.898 1.406 0.850 1.619 
29 1.514 1.853 1.361 0.805 1.574 
30 1.469 1.808 1.316 0.0 1.529 
31 1.424 1.763 1.270 0.0 1.484 
32 1.379 1.718 1.225 0.0 1.439 
33 1.334 0.0 1.180 0.0 1.394 
34 1.288 0.0 1.135 0.0 1.348 
35 0.0 0.0 1.090 0.0 0.0 
36 0.0 0.0 1.045 0.0 0.0 
37 1.559 1.898 1.406 0.850 1.619 
38 1.514 1.853 1.361 0.805 1.574 
39 1.469 1.808 1.316 0.0 1,529 
40 1.424 1.763 1.270 0.0 1.484 
41 1.379 1.718 1.225 0.0 1,439 
42 1.334 0.0 1.180 0.0 1,394 
43 1.288 0.0 1.135 0.0 1,348 
44 0.0 0.0 1.090 0.0 0,0 
45 0.0 0.0 1.045 0.0 0.0 
46 1.559 1.898 1.406 0.850 1.619 
47 1.514 1.853 1.361 0,805 1.574 
48 1.469 1.808 1.316 0.0 1.529 
49 1.424 1.763 1.270 0.0 1.484 
50 1.379 1.718 1.225 0.0 1,439 
51 1.334 0.0 1.180 0,0 1,394 
52 1.288 0.0 1.135 0.0 1.348 
53 0.0 0.0 1.090 0.0 0.0 
54 0.0 0.0 1.045 0.0 0.0 
55 1.559 1,898 1.406 0.850 1.619 
56 1.514 1.853 1.361 0.805 1.574 
57 1.469 1.808 1.316 0.0 1.529 
58 1.424 1.763 1.270 0.0 1.484 
59 1.379 1.718 1.225 0.0 1.439 
60 1.334 0.0 1.180 0.0 1.394 
61 1.288 0.0 1.135 0.0 1.348 
62 0.0 0.0 1.090 0.0 0.0 
63 0.0 0.0 1.045 0.0 0.0 
64 1.559 1.898 1.406 0.850 1.619 
65 1.514 1.853 1.361 0,805 1.574 
66 1.469 1.808 1.316 0,0 1.529 
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Table D.l (Continued) 
Model Alternative 
resource 
situation A B c (feet per acre) 
D E 
67 1.424 1,763 1.270 0.0 1.484 
68 1.379 1.718 1.225 0,0 1.439 
69 1.334 0.0 1.180 0.0 1.394 
70 1.288 0.0 1.135 0.0 1.348 
71 0.0 0.0 1,090 0.0 0.0 
72 0.0 0.0 1.045 0.0 0.0 
73 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
74 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
75 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
76 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
77 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
78 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
79 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
80 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
81 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
82 1.559 0.0 1,406 0.0 1.619 
83 0.0 0.0 1,361 0.0 0.0 
84 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
85 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
86 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
87 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
88 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
89 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
90 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
91 1.559 0.0 1.406 0.0 1.619 
92 0,0 0.0 1,361 0.0 0.0 
93 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
94 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
95 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
97 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
98 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
99 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
100 1.559 0.0 1.406 0.0 1,619 
101 0.0 0,0 1.361 0.0 0.0 
102 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
103 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
104 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
105 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
106 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
107 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
108 0.0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0.0 
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Table D.l (Continued) 
Resource 
Situation 
Model Alternative 
A B C 
(feet per acre) 
D E 
109 1.559 0.0 1.406 0.0 1.619 
110 0.0 0.0 1.361 0.0 0.0 
111 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
112 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
113 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
114 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
115 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
116 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
117 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
118 1.559 0.0 1.406 0.0 1.619 
119 0.0 0.0 1.361 0.0 0.0 
120 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
121 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
122 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
123 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
124 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
125 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
126 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
127 1.559 0.0 1.406 0.0 1.619 
128 0.0 0.0 1.361 0.0 0.0 
129 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
130 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
131 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
132 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
133 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
134 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
135 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
136 1.559 0.0 1.406 0.0 1.619 
137 0.0 0.0 1.361 0.0 0.0 
138 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
139 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
140 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
141 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
142 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
143 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
144 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table D.l (Continued) 
Resource 
situation 
Model Alternative 
A B C 
(feet per acre) 
D E 
1995 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0,0 
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
10 1.673 2.139 1.482 0,916 1.734 
11 1.628 2.093 1.437 0.871 1,689 
12 1.583 2.048 1.391 0,0 1,644 
13 1.538 2.003 1.346 0.0 1.599 
14 1.493 1.958 1.301 0.0 1,554 
15 1.447 0.0 1.256 0.0 1,508 
16 1.402 0.0 1.211 0.0 1.463 
17 0.0 0.0 1.166 0.0 0,0 
18 0.0 0.0 1.121 0.0 0,0 
19 1.673 2.139 1.482 0.916 1.734 
20 1.628 2.093 1.437 0.871 1,689 
21 1.583 2.048 1.391 0.0 1,644 
22 1.538 2.003 1.346 0,0 1,599 
23 1.493 1.958 1.301 0,0 1,554 
24 1.447 0.0 1.256 0,0 1,508 
25 1.402 0.0 1.211 0.0 1,463 
26 0.0 0.0 1.166 0.0 0.0 
27 0.0 0.0 1.121 0.0 0,0 
28 1.673 2.139 1.482 0.916 1,734 
29 1.628 2.093 1.437 0.871 1,689 
30 1.583 2.048 1.391 0.0 1,644 
31 1.538 2.003 1.346 0.0 1,599 
32 1.493 1.958 1.301 0.0 1.554 
33 1.447 0.0 1.256 0.0 1.508 
34 1.402 0.0 1.211 0.0 1.463 
35 0.0 0.0 1.166 0.0 0.0 
36 0.0 0.0 1.121 0.0 0,0 
37 1.673 2.139 1.482 0.916 1,734 
38 1.628 2.093 1.437 0.871 1,689 
39 1.583 2.048 1.391 0.0 1,644 
40 1.538 2.003 1.346 0.0 1,599 
41 1.493 1.958 1.301 0.0 1,554 
42 1.447 0.0 1.256 0.0 1.508 
43 1.402 0.0 1.211 0.0 1,463 
si 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
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(Continued) 
Model Alternative 
A B c 
(feet per 
D 
acre) 
E 
0.0 0.0 1.166 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 1.121 0.0 0.0 
1.673 2.139 1.482 0.916 1.734 
1.628 2.093 1.437 0.871 1.689 
1.583 2.048 1.391 0.0 1.644 
1.538 2.003 1.346 0.0 1.599 
1.493 1.958 1.301 0.0 1.554 
1.447 0.0 1.256 0.0 1.508 
1.402 0.0 1.211 0.0 1.463 
0.0 0.0 1.166 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 1.121 0.0 0.0 
1.673 2.139 1.482 0.916 1.734 
1.628 2.093 1.437 0.871 1.689 
1.583 2.048 1.391 0.0 1.644 
1.538 2.003 1.346 0.0 1.599 
1.493 1.958 1.301 0.0 1.554 
1.447 0.0 1.256 0.0 1.508 
1.402 0.0 1.211 0.0 1.463 
0.0 0.0 1.166 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 1.121 0.0 0.0 
1.673 2.139 1.482 0.0 1.734 
1.628 2.093 1.437 0.916 1.689 
1.583 2.048 1.391 0.871 1.644 
1.538 2.003 1.346 0.0 1.599 
1.493 1.958 1.301 0.0 1.554 
1.447 0.0 1.256 0.0 1.508 
1.402 0.0 1.211 0.0 1.463 
0.0 0.0 1.166 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 1.121 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.559 0.0 1.482 0.0 1.734 
0.0 0.0 1.437 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
siti 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
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(Continued) 
Model Alternative 
A B c 
(feet per 
D 
acre) 
E 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.559 0.0 1.482 0,0 1.734 
0,0 0.0 1.437 0,0 0.0 
0,0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
1.559 0,0 1.482 0.0 1,734 
0.0 0,0 1.437 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0,0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0,0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.559 0.0 1.482 0.0 1.734 
0.0 0.0 1.437 0.0 0,0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
1.559 0,0 1,482 0.0 1,734 
0.0 0,0 1,437 0.0 0,0 
0.0 0,0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0,0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0,0 0,0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0,0 0.0 0,0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0,0 
1.559 0.0 1.482 0.0 1,734 
0.0 0.0 1.437 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table D,. 1 (Continued) 
Model Alternative Resource 
situation A  B  C  (feet per 
D  
acre) 
E  
130 O
 
o
 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
131 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
132 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
133 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
134 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
135 0.0 0.0 0;0 0.0 0.0 
136 1.559 0.0 1.482 0.0 1.734 
137 0.0 0.0 1.437 0.0 0.0 
138 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
139 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
140 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
141 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
O
 
O
 
142 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
143 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
144 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2000 
0.0 0.0 
1  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
4  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
5  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
9  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 0  0.0 2.431 0.0 0.991 0.0 
1 1  0.0 2.386 0.0 0.946 0.0 
1 2  0.0 2.341 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 3  0.0 2.296 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 4  0.0 2.251 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 5  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 6  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 7  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 8  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 9  1.800 2.431 1.564 0.991 1.863 
20 1.755 2.386 1.519 0.946 1.817 
21 1.710 2.341 1.474 0.0 1.772 
22 1.665 2.296 1.429 0.0 1.727 
23 1.620 2.251 1.384 0.0 1.682 
24 1.575 0.0 1.339 0.0 1.637 
25 1.529 0.0 1.293 0.0 1.592 
26 0.0 0.0 1.248 0.0 0.0 
27 0.0 0.0 1.203 0.0 0.0 
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Table D.l (Continued) 
Model Alternative 
Resource 
situation 
A B C D 
(feet per acre) 
E 
28 1.800 2.431 1.564 0.991 1.863 
29 1.755 2.386 1.519 0.946 1.817 
30 1.710 2,341 1.474 0.0 1.772 
31 1.665 2.296 1.429 0.0 1.727 
32 1.620 2.251 1.384 0.0 1.682 
33 1.575 0.0 1.339 0.0 1.637 
34 1.529 0.0 1.293 0.0 1.592 
35 0.0 0.0 1.248 0.0 0.0 
36 0.0 0.0 1.203 0.0 0.0 
37 • 1.800 2.431 1.564 0.991 1.863 
38 1.755 2.386 1.519 0.946 1.817 
39 1.710 2.341 1.474 0.0 1.772 
40 1.665 2.296 1.429 0.0 1.727 
41 1.620 2.251 1.384 0.0 1.682 
42 1.575 0.0 1.339 0.0 1.637 
43 1.529 0.0 1.293 0.0 1.592 
44 0.0 0.0 1.248 0.0 0.0 
45 0.0 0.0 1.203 0.0 0.0 
46 1.800 2.431 1.564 0.991 1.863 
47 1.755 2.386 1.519 0.946 1.817 
48 1.710 2.341 1.474 0.0 1.772 
49 1.665 2.296 1.429 0.0 1.727 
50 1.620 2.251 1.384 0.0 1.682 
51 1.575 0.0 1.339 0.0 1.637 
52 1.529 0.0 1.293 0.0 1.592 
53 0.0 0.0 1.248 0.0 0.0 
54 0.0 0.0 1.203 0.0 0.0 
55 1.800 2.431 1.564 0.991 1.863 
56 1.755 2.386 1.519 Ô.946 1.817 
57 1.710 2.341 1.474 0.0 1.772 
58 1.665 2.296 1.429 0.0 1.727 
59 1.620 2.251 1.384 0.0 1.682 
60 1.575 0.0 1.339 0.0 1.637 
61 1.529 
O
 
o
 1.293 0.0 1.592 
62 0.0 
o
 
o
 1.248 0.0 0.0 
63 0.0 o
 
o
 
1.203 0.0 0.0 
64 1.800 2.431 1.564 0.991 1.863 
65 1.755 2.386 1.519 0.946 1.817 
66 1.710 2.341 1.474 0.0 1.772 
67 1.665 2.296 1.429 0.0 1.727 
68 1.620 2.251 1.384 0.0 1.682 
69 1.575 0.0 1.339 0.0 1.637 
70 1.529 0.0 1.293 0.0 1.592 
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Table D.l (Continued) 
Model Alternative Resource A B C D 
situation (feet per acre) 
13 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
14 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
15 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
17 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
18 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
19 1.944 2.791 1.656 1.075 2.008 
20 1.899 2.746 1.611 1.030 1.962 
21 1.854 2.701 1.565 0.0 1.917 
22 1.809 2.656 1.520 0.0 1.872 
23 1.763 2.611 1.475 0.0 1.287 
24 1.717 0.0 1.430 0.0 1.782 
25 1.673 0.0 1.385 0.0 1.737 
26 0.0 0.0 1.340 0.0 0.0 
27 0.0 0.0 1.294 0.0 0.0 
28 1.944 2.791 1.656 1.075 2.008 
29 1.899 2.746 1.611 1.030 1.962 
30 1.854 2.701 1.565 0.0 1.917 
31 1.809 2.656 1.520 0.0 1.872 
32 1.763 2.611 1.475 0.0 1.827 
33 1.718 0.0 1.430 0.0 1.782 
34 1.673 0.0 1.385 0.0 1.737 
35 0.0 0.0 1.340 0.0 0.0 
36 0.0 0.0 1.294 0.0 0.0 
37 1.944 2.791 1.656 1.075 2.008 
38 1.899 2.746 1.611 1.030 1.962 
39 1.854 2.701 1.565 
O
 
O
 1.917 
40 1.809 2.656 1.520 o
 
o
 
1.872 
41 1.763 2.611 1.475 
o
 
o
 1.827 
42 1.718 0.0 1.430 0.0 1.782 
43 1.673 0.0 1.385 
O
 
o
 1.737 
44 0.0 0.0 1.340 0.0 0.0 
45 0.0 0.0 1.294 0.0 0.0 
46 1.944 2.791 1.656 1.075 2.008 
47 1.899 2.746 1.611 1.030 1.962 
48 1.854 2.701 1.565 0.0 1.917 
49 1.809 2.656 1.520 0.0 1.872 
50 1.763 2.611 1.475 0.0 1.827 
51 1.718 0.0 1.430 0.0 1.782 
52 1.673 0.0 1.385 0.0 1.737 
53 0.0 0.0 1.340 
o
 
o
 0.0 
54 0.0 0.0 1.294 0.0 0.0 
55 1.944 2.791 1.656 1.075 2.008 
56 1.899 2.746 1.611 1.030 1.962 
si 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
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(Continued) 
Model Alternative 
A B c 
(feet per 
D 
acre) 
E 
1.854 2,701 1,565 0.0 1.917 
1.809 2.656 1.520 0.0 1.872 
1,763 2,611 1.475 0.0 1.827 
1.718 0.0 1.430 0.0 1.782 
1.673 0.0 1.385 0.0 1-737 
0,0 0.0 1.340 0.0 0-0 
0.0 0.0 1,294 0.0 0-0 
1,944 2.791 1.656 1.075 2-008 
1,899 2,746 1.611 1.030 1.962 
1.865 2,701 1.565 0.0 1.917 
1.809 2.656 1.520 0.0 1.872 
1.763 2,611 1.475 0.0 1-827 
1.710 0,0 1.430 0.0 1.782 
1.673 0,0 1.385 0.0 1.737 
0.0 0,0 1.340 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0,0 1.294 0-0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0-0 
0,0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0-0 
0.0 0-0 0.0 0.0 0-0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0-0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0-0 0-0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0-0 
0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0-0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0-0 
0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0-0 
0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0-0 
0,0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0,0 0,0 0.0 0,0 0.0 
1.944 0,0 1.656 0.0 2.008 
0.0 0,0 1.611 0,0 0.0 
0.0 0,0 0.0 0-0 0.0 
0.0 0,0 0.0 0-0 0.0 
0,0 0.0 0.0 0-0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0-0 0.0 
0,0 0,0 0.0 0-0 0.0 
0,0 0,0 0.0 0-0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
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33 
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37 
38 
39 
40 
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Annual per acre water use for policy simulations 
Type of Policy 
Flexible Fixed Quota 
taxation taxation 
(feet per acre) 
1985 
1.474 1.507 0.500 
1.429 1.462 0.500 
1.383 1.417 0.500 
1.338 1.372 0.500 
1.293 1.327 0.500 
1.248 1.281 0.500 
1.203 1.236 0.500 
0.0 0,0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.474 1.507 1.500 
1.429 1.462 1.500 
1.383 1.417 1.483 
1.338 1.372 1.438 
1.293 1.327 1.392 
1.248 1.281 1.347 
1.203 1.236 1.302 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.474 1.507 1.573 
1.429 1.462 1.528 
1.383 1.417 1.483 
1.338 1.372 1.438 
1.293 1.327 1.392 
1.248 1.281 1.347 
1.203 1.236 1.302 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.474 1.507 1.573 
1.429 1.462 1.528 
1.383 1.417 1.483 
1.338 1.372 1.438 
1.293 1..327 1.392 
1.248 1.281 1.347 
1.203 1.236 1.302 
o
 
o
 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.474 1.507 1.573 
1.429 1.462 1.528 
1.383 1.417 1.483 
1.338 1.372 1.438 
1.293 1.327 1.392 
1.248 1.281 1.347 
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Table D.2 (Continued) 
Type of Policy 
Resource Flexible Fixed Quota 
situation taxation taxation 
(feet per acre) 
43 1.203 1.236 1.302 
44 0.0 0.0 0-0 
45 0.0 0.0 0.0 
46 1.474 1.507 1.573 
47 1.429 1.462 1.528 
48 1.383 1.417 1.483 
49 1.338 1.372 1.438 
50 1.293 1.327 1.392 
51 1.248 1.281 1.347 
52 1.203 1.236 1.302 
53 0.0 0.0 0.0 
54 0.0 0.0 0.0 
55 1.474 1.507 1.573 
56 1.429 1.462 1.528 
57 1.383 1.417 1.483 
58 1.338 1.372 1.438 
59 1.293 1.327 1.392 
60 1.248 1.281 1.347 
61 1.203 1.236 1.302 
62 0.0 0.0 0.0 
63 0.0 0.0 0.0 
64 1.474 1.507 1.573 
65 1.429 1.462 1.528 
66 1.383 1.417 1.483 
67 1.338 1.372 1.438 
68 1.293 1.327 1.392 
69 1.248 1.281 1.347 
70 1.203 1.236 1.302 
7; 0.0 
o
 
o
 0.0 
72 0.0 0.0 0,0 
73 1.474 1.507 0.0 
74 0.0 0.0 0.0 
75 0.0 0.0 0.0 
76 0.0 0.0 0.0 
77 0.0 0.0 0.0 
78 0.0 0.0 0.0 
79 0.0 0.0 0.0 
80 0.0 0.0 0.0 
81 0.0 0.0 0.0 
82 1.474 1.507 1.500 
83 0.0 0.0 0.0 
84 0.0 0.0 0.0 
85 0.0 
O
 
o
 0.0 
86 0.0 0.0 0.0 
sit 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
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(Continued) 
Type of Policy 
Flexible Fixed Quota 
taxation taxation 
(feet per acre) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.474 1.507 1.573 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.474 1.507 1.573 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.474 1.507 1.573 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.474 1.507 1.573 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.474 1.507 1.573 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Tabid D.2 (Continued) 
Resource 
situation 
Flexible 
taxation 
Type of Policy 
Fixed 
taxation 
(feet per acre) 
Quota 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
1.474 
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.507 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.573 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.573 
1.527 
1.482 
1.437 
1.392 
1.347 
1.302 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.573 
1.527 
1.482 
1.437 
1.392 
1.347 
1.302 
0 . 0  
1990 
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.581 
1.536 
1.491 
1.446 
1.401 
1.355 
1.310 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.581 
1.536 
1.491 
1.446 
1.401 
1.355 
1.310 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
1.500 
1.500 
1.500 
1.500 
1.493 
1.448 
1.403 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.674 
1.629 
1.584 
1.539 
1.493 
1.448 
1.403 
0 . 0  
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Table D.2 (Continued) 
Type of Policy 
Resource Flexible Fixed Quota 
situation taxation taxation 
(feet per acre) 
27 0.0 0.0 0.0 
28 1.573 1.581 1.674 
29 1.527 1.536 1.629 
30 1.482 1.491 1.584 
31 1.437 1.446 1.539 
32 1.392 1.401 1.493 
33 1.347 1.355 1.448 
34 1.302 1.310 1.403 
35 0.0 0.0 0.0 
36 0.0 0.0 0.0 
37 1.573 1.581 1.674 
38 1.527 1.536 1.629 
39 1.482 1.491 1.584 
40 1.437 1.446 1.539 
41 1.392 1.401 1.493 
42 1.347 1.355 1.448 
43 1.302 1.310 1.403 
44 0.0 0.0 0.0 
45 0.0 0.0 0.0 
46 1.573 1.581 1.674 
47 1.527 1.536 1.629 
48 1.482 1.491 1.584 
49 1.437 1.446 1.539 
50 1.392 1.401 1.493 
51 1.347 1.355 1.448 
52 1.302 1.310 1.403 
53 0.0 0.0 0.0 
54 0.0 0.0 0.0 
55 1.573 1.581 1.674 
56 1.527 1.536 1.629 
57 1.482 1.491 1.584 
58 1.437 1.446 1.539 
59 1.392 1.401 1.493 
60 1.347 1.355 1.448 
61 1.302 1.310 1.403 
62 0.0 0.0 0.0 
63 0.0 0.0 0.0 
64 1.573 1.581 1.674 
65 1.527 1.536 1.629 
66 1.482 1.491 1.584 
67 1.437 1.446 1.539 
68 1.392 1.401 1.493 
69 1.347 1.355 1.448 
siti 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
189 
(Continued) 
Type of Policy 
Flexible Fixed Quota 
taxation taxation 
(feet per acre) 
1.302 1.310 1.403 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 • 0.0 
1.573 1.581 1.500 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.573 1.581 1.674 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0,0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.573 1.581 1.674 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.573 1.581 1.674 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table D.2 (Continued) 
Type of Policy 
Resource 
situation 
Flexible 
taxation 
Fixed 
taxation 
Quota 
(feet per acre) 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1. 
0 .  
0.  
0 .  
573 
0  
0  
, 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.573 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.573 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.581 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.581 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.581 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
1.674 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.674 
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.674 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1995 
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
191 
Table D.2 (Continued) 
Type of Policy 
Resource Flexible Fixed Quota 
situation taxation taxation 
(feet per acre) 
10 1.687 1.661 1.024 
11 1.642 1.615 1.024 
12 1.597 1.570 1.024 
13 1.551 1.525 1.024 
14 1.506 1.480 1.024 
15 1.461 1.435 1.024 
16 1.416 1.390 1.024 
17 0.0 0.0 0.0 
18 0.0 0.0 0.0 
19 1.687 1.661 1.791 
20 1.642 1.615 1.746 
21 1.597 1.570 1.701 
22 1.551 1.525 1.655 
23 1.506 1.480 1.610 
24 1.416 1.435 1.565 
25 1.416 1.390 1.520 
26 0.0 0.0 0.0 
27 0.0 0.0 0.0 
28 1.687 1.661 1.791 
29 1.642 1.615 1.746 
30 1.597 1.570 1.701 
31 1.551 1.525 1.655 
32 1.506 1.480 1.610 
33 1.461 1.435 1.565 
34 1.416 1.390 1.520 
35 
o
 
o
 0.0 0.0 
36 0.0 0.0 0.0 
37 1.687 1.661 1.791 
38 1.64,2 1.615 1.746 
39 1.597 1.570 1.701 
40 1.551 1.525 1.655 
41 1.506 1.480 1.610 
42 1.461 1.435 1.565 
43 1.416 1.390 1.520 
44 0.0 0.0 0.0 
45 o
 
o
 
0.0 0.0 
46 1.687 1.661 1.791 
47 1.642 1.615 1.746 
48 1.597 1.570 1.701 
49 1.551 1.525 1.655 
50 1.506 1.480 1.610 
51 1.461 1.435 1.565 
52 1.416 1.390 1.520 
si 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
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(Continued) 
Type of Policy 
Flexible Fixed Quota 
taxation taxation 
(feet per acre) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.687 1.661 1.791 
1.642 1.615 1.746 
1.597 1.570 1.701 
1.551 1.525 1.655 
1.461 1.435 1.565 
1.461 1.435 1.565 
1.416 1.390 1.520 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.687 1.661 1.791 
1.642 1.615 1.746 
1.597 1.570 1.701 
1.551 1.525 1,655 
1.506 1.480 1.610 
1.461 1.435 1.565 
1.416 1.390 1.520 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.687 1.661 1.024 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.687 1.661 1.791 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table D.2 (Continued) 
Type of Policy 
Resource Flexible Fixed Quota 
situation taxation taxation 
(feet per acre) 
96 0.0 0.0 0.0 
97 0.0 0.0 0.0 
98 0.0 0.0 0.0 
99 0.0 0.0 0.0 
100 1.687 1.661 1.791 
101 0.0 0.0 0.0 
102 0.0 0.0 0.0 
103 0.0 0.0 0.0 
104 0.0 0.0 0.0 
105 0.0 0.0 0.0 
106 0.0 0.0 0.0 
107 0.0 0.0 0.0 
108 0.0 0.0 0.0 
109 1.687 1.661 1.791 
110 0.0 0.0 0.0 
111 0.0 0.0 0.0 
112 0.0 0.0 0.0 
113 0.0 0.0 0.0 
114 0.0 0.0 0.0 
115 0.0 0.0 0.0 
116 0.0 0.0 0.0 
117 0.0 0.0 0.0 
118 1.687 1.661 1.791 
119 0.0 0.0 0.0 
120 0.0 0.0 0.0 
121 0.0 0.0 0.0 
122 0.0 0.0 0.0 
123 0.0 0.0 o
 
o
 
124 0.0 0.0 0.0 
125 0.0 0.0 0.0 
126 0.0 0.0 0.0 
127 1.687 1.661 1.791 
128 0.0 0.0 0.0 
129 0.0 0.0 0.0 
130 0.0 0.0 0.0 
131 0.0 0.0 0.0 
132 0.0 0.0 0.0 
133 0.0 0.0 0.0 
134 0.0 0.0 0.0 
135 0.0 0.0 0.0 
136 1.687 1.661 1.791 
137 0.0 0.0 0.0 
138 0.0 0.0 0.0 
sit 
Ï39 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
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(Continued) 
Type of Policy 
Flexible Fixed Quota 
taxation taxation 
(feet per acre) 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
2000 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 , 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0.0 , 0.0 0.686 
0.0 0.0 0.686 
0.0 0.0 0.686 
0.0 0.0 0.686 
0.0 0.0 0.686 
0.0 0.0 0.686 
0.0 0.0 0.686 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
1.814 1.739 1.686 
1.769 1.694 1.686 
1.724 1.649 1.686 
1.679 1.603 1.686 
1.633 1.558 1.686 
1.588 1.513 1.686 
1.543 1.468 1.651 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
1.814 1.739 1.922 
1.769 1.694 1.877 
1.724 1.649 1.832 
1.679 1.603 1.787 
1.633 1.558 1.742 
1.588 1.513 1.696 
1.543 1.468 1.651 
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  
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Table D,2 (Continued) 
Type of Policy 
Resource Flexible Fixed Quota 
situation taxation taxation 
(feet per acre) 
37 1.814 1.739 1.922 
38 1.769 1.694 1.877 
39 1.724 1.649 1.832 
40 1.679 1.603 1.787 
41 1.633 1.558 1.742 
42 1.588 1.513 1.696 
43 1.543 1.468 1.651 
44 0.0 0.0 0.0 
45 0.0 0.0 0.0 
45 1.814 1.739 1.922 
47 1.769 1.694 1.877 
48 1.724 1.649 1.832 
49 1.679 1.603 1.787 
50 1.633 1.558 1.742 
51 1.588 1.513 1.696 
52 1.543 1.468 1.651 
53 0.0 0.0 0.0 
54 0.0 0.0 0.0 
55 1.814 1.739 1.922 
56 1.769 1.694 1.877 
57 1.724 1.649 1.832 
58 1.679 1.603 1.787 
59 1.633 1.558 1.742 
60 1.588 1.513 1.696 
61 1.543 1.468 1.651 
62 0.0 0.0 0.0 
63 0.0 0.0 0.0 
64 1.814 1.739 1.922 
65 1.769 1.694 1.877 
66 1.724 1.649 1.832 
67 1.679 1.603 1.787 
68 1.633 1.558 1.742 
69 1.588 1.513 1.696 
70 1.543 1.468 1.651 
71 0.0 0.0 0.0 
72 0.0 0.0 0.0 
73 0.0 0.0 0.0 
74 0.0 0.0 0.0 
75 0.0 0.0 0.0 
76 0.0 0.0 0.0 
77 0.0 0.0 0.0 
78 0.0 0.0 0.0 
79 0.0 0.0 0.0 
80 0.0 0.0 0.0 
81 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table D.2 (Continued) 
Resource 
situation 
Flexible 
taxation 
Type of Policy 
Fixed 
taxation 
Quota 
(feet per acre) 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.814 
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.814 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0  
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.739 
0.0 
0 . 0  
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.739 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.922 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.922 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0.0 
0.0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0-0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
2.067 
2.022 
1.977 
1.932 
2005 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.813 
1.768 
1.723 
1.678 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.423 
1.423 
1.423 
1.423 
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Table D.2 (Continued) 
Type of Policy 
Resource Flexible Fixed Quota 
situation taxation taxation 
(feet per acre) 
23 1.887 1.635 1.423 
24 1.842 1.588 1.423 
25 1.796 1.542 1.423 
26 0.0 0.0 0.0 
27 0.0 0.0 0.0 
28 2.067 1.813 2.069 
29 2.022 1.768 2.024 
30 1.977 1.723 1.978 
31 1.932 1.678 1.933 
32 1.887 1.635 1.888 
33 1.842 1.588 1.843 
34 1.796 1.542 1.798 
35 0.0 0.0 0.0 
36 0.0 0.0 0.0 
37 2.067 1.813 2.069 
38 2.022 1.768 2.024 
39 1.977 1.723 1.978 
40 1.932 1.678 1.933 
41 1.887 1.635 1.888 
42 1.842 1.588 1.843 
43 1.796 1.542 1.798 
44 0.0 0.0 0.0 
45 0.0 0.0 0.0 
46 2.067 1.813 2.069 
47 2.022 1.768 2.024 
48 1.977 1.723 1.978 
49 1.932 1.678 1.933 
50 1.887 1.635 1.888 
51 1.842 1.588 1.843 
52 1.796 1.542 1.798 
53 0.0 0.0 0.0 
54 0.0 0.0 0.0 
55 2.057 1.813 2.069 
56 2.022 1.768 2.024 
57 1.977 1.723 1.978 
58 1.932 1.678 1.933 
59 1.887 1.635 1.888 
60 1.842 1.588 1.843 
61 1.796 1.542 1.798 
62 0.0 0.0 0.0 
63 0.0 0.0 0.0 
64 2.067 1.813 2.069 
65 2.022 1.768 2.024 
66 1.977 1.723 1.978 
sit 
W 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
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(Continued) 
Type of Policy 
Flexible Fixed Quota 
taxation taxation 
(feet per acre) 
1.932 1.678 1.933 
1.887 1.635 1.888 
1.842 1.588 1.843 
1.796 1.542 1.798 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0,0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
2.067 1.813 1.423 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
2.067 1.813 2.069 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0,0 
0.0 0.0 0,0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0,0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0,0 0,0 
2.067 1.813 2,069 
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Table D.2 (Continued) 
Type of Policy 
Resource Flexible Fixed Quota 
situation taxation taxation 
(feet per acre) 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 .0  
0 .0  
0 . 0  
2.067 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0.0 
2.067 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
2.067 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.813 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.813 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
1.813 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
2.069 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
0.0 
2.069 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
2.069 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
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APPENDIX E: ANNUAL USER COSTS PER ACRE 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
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E.l. User costs per acre for five model alternatives with the 
social optimal model 
Model Alternative 
A B C D E 
(dollars/acre) 
7.10 10.02 6.10 7.10 3.57 
6.01 6.79 5.62 6.01 2.81 
5.63 6.41 5.25 5.63 2.45 
5.29 6.06 4.91 5.29 2.14 
4.96 5.74 4.59 4.96 1.87 
4.65 5.43 4.29 4.65 1.63 
4.37 5.14 4.01 4.37 1.43 
4.10 4.87 3.75 4.10 1.25 
3.85 4.61 3.51 3.85 1.09 
3.61 4.37 3.28 3.61 0.95 
3.39 4.15 3.07 3.39 0.83 
3.18 3.94 2.87 3.18 0.73 
2.99 3.74 2.68 2.99 0.63 
2.81 3.55 2.51 2.81 0.55 
2,64 3.38 2.35 2.64 0.48 
2.47 3.21 2.19 2.47 0.42 
2.32 3.06 2.05 2.32 0.37 
2.18 2.91 1.92 2.18 0.32 
2.05 2.77 1.79 2.05 0.28 
1.93 2.64 1.67 1.93 0.25 
1.81 2.52 1.57 1.81 0.22 
